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REBALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN
THE LAW OF MORTGAGE TRANSFER
JOHN PATRICK HUNT,* RICHARD STANTON** & NANCY WALLACE***

The law governing the United States' $13 trillion mortgage market is
broken. Courts and legislaturesaround the country continue to struggle with
the fallout from the effort to build a twenty-first century global market in
mortgages on a fragmented, archaic legal foundation. These authorities'
struggles stem in largepartfrom the lack of clarity about the legal requirements
for mortgage transfer, the key processfor contemporary mortgagefinance.
This Article argues that American mortgage transfer law is unclear in two
distinct respects and offers suggestions for fixing the law. It is currently
unclear whether a recorded mortgage assignment is needed to make sure that a
mortgage transferee has a protected interest in the mortgage. It also is unclear
whether a recorded assignment is needed to make sure that the transferee can
lawfully foreclose on the mortgage. Revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code
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adopted around the turn of the century may be interpreted as doing away with
preexisting laws arguably requiringparties to record their ownership interests
to protect those interests and to foreclose on the mortgage. But the interaction
of these revisions and preexisting state recording laws is most unclear, with
consequencesfor borrowers, investors, and securitization arrangers.
This Article suggests an approach to law reform that would provide needed
clarity and bring about an appropriate balance between private and public
priorities. The Article 9 revisions reflect a preoccupation, prevalent in the
1990s, with reducing the cost of mortgage transfers to the transactingparties.
Obviating public recording, as the Article 9 revisions purport to do, does
reduce cost, but it also tends to eliminatepublic records of mortgage ownership.
As we demonstrate, these public records have value, not only for parties that
may transact in mortgages, but also for the public more generally. A more
balanced approach would unequivocally require transactingparties to record
their interests in order to protect them but would adopt this change in tandem
with an expansion of low-cost digital recording. This approachprovides the
public benefits of high-quality mortgage records while reducing the cost and
inconvenience of recording to transactingparties.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

In troduction .......................................................................................
1531
I. Mortgage Securitization and Mortgage Transfer .................. 1536
II. Conflicts Between Article 9 and Mortgage Recording Law... 1540
A. Conflicting Methods of Protecting Interests in a
M ortgage ...........................................
1540
1. State real-property recording rules for protecting
interests in m ortgages .................................................
1541
2. Article 9 rules for protecting interests in mortgages 1545
a. Brief history of Article 9's interaction with
recording statutes .................................................
1547
b. Article 9's provisions for perfecting interests in
mortgages after the 1999 revisions ...................... 1548
3. Analyzing the conflict over protection of
ownership interests under current law ...................... 1550
4. Disputes in which the conflict over protection of
ownership interests is relevant ................................... 1555
a. Investor litigation ..................................................
1556
b. MERS bankruptcy .................................................
1556
c. Recorder litigation ................................................
1560
B. Conflicting Mortgage Foreclosure Rules ........................ 1561
1. Article 9 rules for foreclosure ..................................... 1561
2. State real-property recording rules for foreclosure ..1562
3. Analyzing the foreclosure conflict under current
law ..............................................
15 6 3
4. Disputes in which the foreclosure conflict is
relevan t ........................................................................
1566

1531

REBALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

2013]

III. The Need for Reform and the Value of Public Title
1567
R eco rds ........................................................
IV. Moving Toward Public Mortgage Ownership Records .......... 1575
Ownership
for Mortgage
A. Legal Infrastructure
1576
Recordin g .........................................................................
B. Institutional Infrastructure for Mortgage Ownership
1578
Recording ....................................................................
Authoritative national lien
1. Alternative one:
1579
registry ..................................................
a. Description of the authoritative national lien
registry and its legal infrastructure ...................... 1579
b. Implementation issues with an authoritative
1581
national lien registry .............................................
Upgrading local recording
2. Alternative two:
1584
system s .........................................................................
1585
Con clu sion .........................................................................................

INTRODUCTION
Although the U.S. mortgage market is about 80% of the size of the
U.S. stock market,' the mortgage market does not get anywhere near
80% of the stock market's attention from the legal academy. This
relative lack of attention would be understandable if mortgage law
were clear and well-settled and if the mortgage market functioned
smoothly. But recent events have shown the opposite to be true.
Failed mortgages lay at the heart of the financial crisis,2 and the legal
system spends an inordinate amount of time and energy piecing
through the fallout.3 Mortgage law is overdue for increased scrutiny,
in line with its importance to the American economy and American
lives. This Article seeks to contribute to a much-needed critical

1.

See

Mortgage Debt Outstanding, BOARD

GOVERNORS

FED.

RESERVE

SYS.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/current.htm
(last modified June 2013) (reporting third-quarter 2012 mortgage debt outstanding
of $13.1 trillion); S&P Dow Jones, Dow Jones U.S. Total Stock Market Index Fact Sheet 1,
http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/fact-info/Dowjones-US TotalSto
ckMarketIndexFactSheet.pdf (last modified July 2013) (reporting float-adjusted
market capitalization of U.S. stock market at $18.6 trillion).
2. Both the majority and dissenting members of the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission reached this conclusion.

See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FINANCIAL CRISIS

INQUIRYREPORT, at xxiii (2011), availableat http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC
/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (characterizing declining standards for mortgage lending and
the mortgage securitization pipeline as igniting the crisis); see also id. at 417-18
(statement of dissenting commissioners) (describing increased investment in highrisk mortgages as the most significant indicator of the credit bubble in the United

States and Europe).

3. AJune 26, 2013, advanced case search in WestlawNext for <(mortgage "deed
of trust") /s foreclose!> returned 2,450 results for 2012, as compared with 677 for
2006, the last year before the mortgage crisis.
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examination of mortgage law.4 It explains why a crucial piece of that
law-the law of mortgage transfer-is currently broken and offers
suggestions for how to fix it.
Mortgage transfer has emerged as particularly important in recent
years for two related reasons. The first reason is that so many
mortgage transfers have occurred. Securitization has emerged as a
key channel of mortgage finance, and securitization involves the
transfer of mortgages from the originating lender, often through
intermediate entities, to a securitization vehicle. Particularly in
private-label securitizations of the 2000s, each mortgage was
transferred several times.'
The second reason is that mortgage
transfers have been scrutinized because of the financial and
foreclosure crisis. Disappointed investors and defaulting borrowers
alike have questioned whether securitized mortgages, particularly
subprime mortgages,' were transferred properly.7 Investors have
sought to hold securitization arrangers liable for improperly
structured transactions, and borrowers have raised questions about
transfers in foreclosure litigation.
4. Securitization generally has received a good deal of scholarly attention, See,
e.g., Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
1061 (1996) (highlighting the efficiency benefits of securitization); Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization,41 CoNN. L. REv. 1313 (2009) (discussing defects
with securitization exposed by the financial crisis).
Mortgage securitization in
particular appears to have received less attention than its importance would justify.
A relatively small number of articles have addressed this topic. See, e.g., Thomas E.
Plank, Crisis in the Mortgage Finance Market: The Nature of the Mortgage Loan and
Regulatory Reform, TRANsACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L., Spring 2011, at 135, 142-44
(arguing that mortgage securitization is needed to protect against the risk of
originator bankruptcy over the long term of the typical mortgage loan). The specific
issue of mortgage transfer apparently received little attention until the foreclosure
crisis.
5. See discussion infra Part I.
6. Yuliya Demyanyk and Otto Van Hemert have analyzed relevant data from the
FirstAmerican CoreLogic database, which contains approximately 85% of subprime
loans. See Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understandingthe Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. STUDS. 1848, 1853-54 (2011). Demyanyk and Van Hemert give
the number of subprime loans and the average loan size in the database each year
from 2001 to 2007. See id. at 1854 tbl.1. Multiplying the number of loans by the
average loan size for each year and summing across the seven years gives a total of
$1.614 trillion in subprime loans in the database for 2001 to 2007. Not all these
loans were securitized. Demyanyk and Van Hemert report securitization rates for
2001 to 2006, ranging from 54% in 2001 to 76% in 2004 and 2005. Id. at 1853 n.6.
Multiplying the securitization rate for each year by the subprime loan issuance for
that year and summing across the six years gives an estimate of $1.113 trillion in
securitized subprime loans in the database for 2001 to 2006. Although this estimate
is not perfect because securitized loans might have been larger or smaller on average
than non-securitized loans, the technique described provides a ballpark figure for
securitized subprime loans in the FirstAmerican CoreLogic database. Considering
that 15% of subprime loans are not in the database at all, id. at 1853, the $1 trillion
figure in the text seems conservative.
7. See discussion infra Part II.A.4, B.4.
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We identify two discrete problems with the current law of mortgage
transfer: ambiguity and insufficient weight afforded to the value of
public title records.
The first problem is that current law is
ambiguous is two distinct ways. The first ambiguity is that in many
states it is unclear whether a mortgage buyer must record its interest
in order to ensure that its ownership interest in the mortgage is
protected from subsequent claimants.' This ambiguity arises because
mortgage loans have two parts, each potentially governed by its own
set of rules, and the rules may be in conflict with each other.
Mortgage loans, as currently structured, typically consist of two
instruments: a mortgage and a promissory note. Under the laws of
many states, the mortgage itself is a real-property interest covered by
the real-property recording laws.9 These recording statutes may
provide that a buyer's interest in the mortgage is at risk if the buyer
does not record its interest in the mortgage in records maintained by
a local official. The promissory note, on the other hand, is governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The "1999 revisions" to
Article 9 of the UCC, adopted in the fifty states between 1999 and
2001,' ° apparently provide that buyers' interests in promissory notes
and associated mortgages can be protected without any recording."
The UCC and real-property recording statutes thus may give different
answers to the question whether the buyer's ownership interest is
protected.
8. See discussion infraPart II.A.1-2.
9. See discussion infraPart II.A.1.
10. We follow convention in calling these amendments the "1999 revisions," even
though they were approved by the membership of the American Law Institute and by
the Uniform Law Commissioners in 1998. See 4JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PRACTITIONER'S TREATISE SERIES § 30-1, at 2 (6th ed.

2010). The revisions were adopted in all states by the end of 2001.

See Julian B.

McDonnell, Enteringa New Period of Reevaluation, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE

UCC § 1A.01 (Matthew Bender ed., 2013) [hereinafter McDonnell, Entering a New
Period]; David Frisch, The Recent Amendments to UCCArticle 9: Problems and Solutions, 45
U. RICH. L. REv. 1009, 1009 n.3 (2011) (noting that the revised Article 9 went into
effect in forty-five states and the District of Columbia by July 1, 2001 and in all fifty
states byJanuary 1, 2002);Julian B. McDonnell, Is Revised Article 9 a Little Greedy?, 104
COM. L.J. 241, 241 (1999) [hereinafter McDonnell, Article 9 Greedy?] (stating that at
least six states had adopted amendments in 1999). Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code also contains provisions relevant to transfer of mortgage and note.
See REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
APPLICATION

OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO

MORTGAGE NOTES 4-7 (2011) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD],

available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/CommitteesMaterials/PEBUCC/
PEBReport- 11411.pdf (explaining how transfers affect the obligations of mortgage
holders). Compliance with Article 3 may be important in preserving the right to
foreclose on transferred mortgages, but because the Article 3 rules do not address
the issue of mortgage recording, we do not discuss them at length in this Article.
11. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(g), 9-308(e), 9-607(b) (2011) (discussed infra Part
II.A.2).
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The second ambiguity has to do with foreclosure. 12 In many states,
it is unclear whether a mortgage buyer must record its interest in the
mortgage to ensure that the buyer can foreclose on the mortgaged
property in case of default. State real-property laws often seem to
require a complete, recorded chain of title to the mortgage as a
prerequisite to foreclosure (although state courts often circumvent
seemingly clear language to this effect)," 3 while the 1999 Article 9
revisions can be read to permit foreclosure without recording. 4
These ambiguities in the law received little attention in a recent,
influential report, 5 Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Selected
Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes ("the Report"), prepared by the
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code ("the
Board")."6 The Report affirms the importance of the Article 9 rules,
stating that the rules "determine matters that are important in the
context of enforcement of mortgage notes and the mortgages that
secure them"'7 and "govern the transfer and enforcement of notes
secured by a mortgage on real property."'" We do not take issue with
the Board's parsing of the complex text of the Article 9 rules, 9 but
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.1-2.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
15. REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, supra note 10. Many courts
have cited the Report approvingly. See, e.g., Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, 666 F.3d 955,
960 n.4 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing the Report's discussion of the
distinction between ownership of and right to enforce negotiable instruments); In re
Veal, 450 B.R. 897, 908 n.12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the court's discussion
of the relationship between Article 3 and Article 9 of the UCC in relation to
mortgage notes "owes much" to the draft Report); Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, No.
C1O-5880BHS, 2012 WL 1204946, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Wash. April 11, 2012) (stating that
the Report helps explain the relationship between owners and servicers of notes); In
reWalker, 466 B.R. 271, 279 n.13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing the view expressed in
the Report that "assignment of the note automatically transfers a corresponding
interest in the mortgage"); In reJackson, 451 B.R. 24, 29 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2011)
(relying on the Report's stance regarding the circumstances under which a party has
the right to enforce a mortgage note). In addition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has cited the Report twelve times, always for the proposition that the owner of a note
may not be entitled to enforce it (e.g., when the owner does not possess the note).
See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., v. Heath, 280 P.3d 328, 333 n.7 (Okla. 2012).
16. The Board was created pursuant to an agreement between the American Law
Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1961.
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey:
Some Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of the U.C.C., 41 Bus. LAw. 1343, 1346
& n.18 (1986). Among the Board's purposes are promoting uniformity in the UCC
and discouraging nonuniform amendments. Id. at 18.
17. REPORT OF THE PERMANENT ED1TORIAL BOARD, supra note 10, at 14.
18. Id. at 1.
19. Some law professors did criticize the Report for purporting to resolve major
social and policy issues through a technical application of statutory text. See Letter
from Robert M. Lawless, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law et al., to
Permanent Editorial Bd. 8 (May 27, 2011) [hereinafter Lawless Letter], available at
http://www.ali.org/pebcl/Levitin.pdf
("A UCC PEB report is simply an

20131

REBALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

1535

we do contend that the statutory ambiguities we describe deserve
greater attention. 21 More fundamentally, we also question whether
the recording-free Article 9 system for mortgage transfers is a good
one to begin with.
This brings us to the second problem with current law: the Article
9 rules may not give enough weight to the value of public tide
records. Article 9 gives short shrift to the interest in high-quality
public records because it purportedly allows the mortgage
transferee's interest to be protected without any recording
anywhere. 2' To the extent that the Article 9 rules prevail over state
real-property recording law, the Article 9 rules obviate mortgage
assignment recording, and thus tend to degrade the quality of public
tide records. Potential buyers of real property, borrowers, and the
public more generally all have legitimate interests in transparent,
public title records, including mortgage records.
There is at least some doubt about whether lawmakers really
thought about and understood what they were doing when they
enacted the 1999 revisions to the Code.22 But even if they did, the
world looks different now: the value of transparent, public mortgage
inappropriate for[u]m for addressing major policy issues. Doing so under the guise
of a technical report does serious harm to the credibility and reputation of the ALI
and NCCUSL").
20. See supra note 11.
21. See discussion infra Part III.
22. Generally, the UCC is the product of a relatively small group of unelected
experts drawn from two bodies, the Uniform Law Commission (formerly the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) and the American
Law Institute. See David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 378-84
(2003) (describing the roles of the NCCUSL and ALI in drafting UCC). The expert
drafters have been called a "private legislature." Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy
Case Against the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 LA. L. REv. 1097, 1101 (2002) (listing
several authorities that indicate that "[tihe U.C.C. is now viewed as the output of a
private legislature"). To be sure, state legislatures decide whether to enact UCC
provisions and the provisions presumably are drafted with a view to whether the
gislatures will in fact adopt them. See EdwardJ. Janger, PredictingWhen the Uniform
Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IowA L. REv. 569,
579 (1998) ("Even when an interest group has not captured the uniform law drafting
process, the drafters may be forced, in the interest of enactability, to anticipate and
approximate the rule that would be produced by a captured state legislature."). But
it appears that state legislatures often do not make meaningful changes to proposed
UCC provisions. See Snyder, supra, at 380 ("Much of the time... the states do what
they are told. Whatever deal was made in the private legislature becomes the deal in
the public legislature."). It does not appear that the Article 9 revisions in particular
were robustly debated in state legislatures. See McDonnell, Article 9 Greedy ?,supra
note 10, at 241 (stating that "[t]here appears to be no organized opposition" to
adoption of the revisions). The Article 9 revisions have been the target of academic
criticism. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, Assignment of Receivables Under Article 9: Structural
Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 234-47 (2007) (arguing that
Article 9 revisions inappropriately force sales of financial instruments into a
framework designed for liens).
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records is clearer than it was before the foreclosure crisis. At the
same time, technology promises to overcome the biggest objection to
maintaining transparent public records, namely the cost and delay of
the traditional recording system. It seems likely that digitization
makes it possible to give the financial services industry the speed and
low cost per mortgage it demands, while also providing transparency
for borrowers, potential purchasers, and other users of land records.23
The law should respond to the changes being worked by
digitization.
Specifically, policymakers should consider clearly
requiring mortgage buyers to make public records of their interests
in order to protect those interests, and should consider introducing
this requirement in tandem with electronic recording. The most
efficient way of accomplishing this may be through a national,
authoritative lien registry, but that approach risks resistance from
local authorities. Accordingly, policymakers should also consider the
alternative approach of upgrading local recording capabilities and
phasing in the recording requirement on a state-by-state basis as the
upgrades are complete.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes basic mechanics of
mortgage securitization and transfer, focusing on the fact that
mortgage assignments were not recorded in securitizations in the
2000s. Part II describes the unclear interaction between Article 9
rules applicable to unrecorded mortgage transfers and other state
laws relating to recording and describes areas in which the unclear
interaction has created problems. Part III argues that policymakers
should reconsider mortgage transfer law, and should do so giving
serious consideration to the value of public mortgage title records.
Part IV argues that mortgage-transfer law should be reformed in
tandem with increased use of electronic recording, and also sketches
alternative legal and institutional arrangements for accomplishing
the suggested reform. The Article concludes by emphasizing the
need to focus on clarity an appropriate balance between public and
private.
I.

MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION AND MORTGAGE TRANSFER

Under current practice, a mortgage loan has two parts:
a
promissory note containing the borrower's promise to repay the loan
with interest and a security instrument granting a lender a security
interest in the real property securing the debt.24 The security
23. See discussion infra Part III.
24.

See 1

GRANT

S. NELSON &

DALE

A.

WHITMAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAW

§ 5.27,
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instrument is commonly called the "mortgage," although the name of
the most commonly used instrument varies from state to state: the
"deed of trust" is the most commonly used instrument in many states,
including California,2 5 and the "security deed" is the most common
instrument in Georgia.2 6 This Article uses "note" to refer to the
promissory note and "mortgage" to refer to the associated realproperty security instrument. To refer to the two together, this
27
Article uses "mortgage loan."
Mortgage securitizations in the 2000s typically involved several
transfers of the promissory note and associated mortgage: from an
"originator" to an investment bank subsidiary known as a "sponsor,"
from the sponsor to another subsidiary known as the "depositor," and
finally from the depositor to the trustee of a trust charged with
holding the mortgages on behalf of investors. 2' This structure
apparently has its origin in requirements for bankruptcy
remoteness.29

at 529 (5th ed. 2007) ("The mortgagee of real property has two things: the
obligation owed by the mortgagor, and the interest in the realty securing that
obligation.").
25. See 1 ROGER BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST, AND
FORECLOSURE LITIGATION § 1.35 (2012) ("In California, the deed of trust has
completely eclipsed the mortgage as the lending and title
industries' preferred
security instrument."); 4 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE § 10:1 (3d ed. 2012).
26. See Ceogia Real Estate InfoBase: The Securay Deed and the Promissory Note, GA.REAL EsT.
COMMISSION (May 12,2011), http://www.gareinfobase.org/guide/requiremenLaspx?id
=cf534cc7-9d5d-elll-bb86-d639cd757391 ("A security deed... is the most common
form of securing a financing agreement for real estate loans in Georgia.").
27. The Article uses the term "mortgage securitization" rather than "mortgage
loan securitization" because of its greater familiarity, but in doing so the term is used
to refer to transactions that attempt to transfer ownership of mortgage and note
together.
28. John Patrick Hunt, Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, All in One Basket: The
Bankruptcy Risk of a National Agent-Based Recording System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 9
(2012). For example, in the GSAMP 2006-HE3 transaction, the sponsor was
Goldman Sachs Mortgage Co. and the depositor was GS Mortgage Securities Corp.
See Amended Complaint at 19, Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
No. 11 Civ. 6198 (DLC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162281 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2012).
29. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB Technical Bulletin No. 01-1,
1 (2008); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 140, at 9 (2000), available at http://www.gasb.org
/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkeyid&blobwhere=l
175820919404&blobheader=application%2Fpdf; Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey,
Mortgage Servicing,28 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 13-15 (2011); Deloitte & Touche, Learningthe

Norwalk Two Step, HEADS Up, April 25, 2001, at 2, 4.
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Figure1: Mortgage andpromissory note transfer with traditionalrecording
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State laws usually provide that mortgage assignments can be
recorded,"0 as discussed in more detail below." However, mortgage
assignments were not recorded in mortgage securitizations, at least

from the late 1990s up to the crash of the private-label mortgage
securitization market in 2007.
Recording may simply have been
impractical:
recording mortgage assignments is burdensome in
mortgage securitizations because of the large volume of assignments
and the relatively tight time frame for each transaction."3 In a typical
30. See 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 5.34, at 614 & n.23 (indicating that
Arkansas is one of the "very few jurisdictions" where recording acts are inapplicable
to mortgage assignments).
31. See discussion infra Part II.A. 1.
32. See Alan M. White, Losing the Paper-MortgageAssignments, Note Transfers and
ConsumerProtection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 468, 484-85 (2012).
33. Tax rules effectively impose a three-month timeframe on mortgage
securitizations by imposing a 100% tax on contributions to the securitization vehicle
made more than three months after the vehicle's startup date. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 860G(d) (2006). Although this rule covers only one particular type of
securitization vehicle, the real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC),
the large majority of residential mortgage securitizations reportedly employ
this form. AEQUITAS COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, INC., FORECLOSURE IN CALIFORNIA:

A CRISIS OF COMPLIANCE 17 (2012), availableat http://www.aequitasaudit.com
/images/aequitas.sLreport.pdf. The pooling and servicing agreement that governs
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"private-label" 4 mortgage securitization from the 2000s, thousands of
mortgage loans from different geographic regions" passed through
at least two corporate entities on their way from the mortgage loan's
originator to their intended destination. The destination was a
special purpose vehicle ("SPV"), generally a trust, that was to hold the
mortgage loans in a pool on behalf of investors who bought
certificates entitling them to cash flows from the pool."6 For example,
in a transaction involving 10,000 mortgage loans, each following the
originator-sponsor-depositor-SPV path, 7 there would be 30,000
separate assignments of the mortgages. 8 Backlogs at local recording
offices may have made it more difficult for transacting parties to
record assignments. 9
At the same time that market participants were not recording
assignments, the mortgage-recording rules discussed above remained
on the books. As discussed below, the decision not to record
mortgage assignments entailed some legal risks, even if the risks were
thought to be small.4" Two innovations of the mid-to-late 1990s
apparently were intended to reduce those risks by obviating
recording. The first was the Mortgage Electronic Registration System
(MERS), which we have discussed at length elsewhere,41 and which
purports to use a common-agent theory to defeat any need to
a given transaction likewise may impose a deadline by which mortgages must be
conveyed to the trust.
34. Our discussion focuses on "private-label" securitizations, i.e., securitizations
other than those carried out by the housing government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See BrentJ. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label
Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REv. 827, 843-48 (2009) (charting the history of
both GSE and private-label securitizations).
35. See GSAMP Trust 2006-HE3, Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus Dated
August 3, 2006, at S-38 to -40 (Form 424B3) (Sept. 7, 2006) (describing the mortgage
pool for one transaction as containing 10,736 mortgage loans with an aggregate
principal balance of $1.6 billion, with no more than 0.23% of the loans secured by
properties in any single zip code).
36. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 29, at 13-14.
37. It appears that in some cases the mortgage may not have followed the
originator-sponsor-depositor chain at all. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n v.
Bassman FBT, L.L.C., 981 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (construing the record as
showing that a securitized mortgage was never conveyed to sponsor or depositor).
38. Hunt, Stanton & Wallace, supra note 28, at 9.
39. See Problems in Mortgage Servicingfrom Modification to Disclosure, Hearing Before
the Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 65 (2010) (statement of
R.K. Arnold, President and Chief Executive Officer, MERSCORP Holdings, Inc.)
[hereinafter Arnold Testimony] ("[A] t certain time periods, the flow of assignments
were [sic] overwhelming the county recorder system, resulting in long backlogs, and
in some cases, taking the county recorder over a year to record an assignment.").
40. See discussion infra Part II.A.4, B.4; see, e.g., 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note
24, § 5.34, at 623 ("After reviewing all of the issues related to recording mortgage
assignments... one must conclude that for the most part, recording is not very
important.").
41. See generally Hunt, Stanton & Wallace, supra note 28.
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record,4 2 and the second was the revision of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code to codify the proposition that "the mortgage
follows the note."43 We now explain the relevant Article 9 revisions in
detail and show that the revisions are in tension with other provisions
of the law of many states.

II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN ARTICLE 9 AND MORTGAGE RECORDING LAW
Article 9 of the UCC may conflict with state real-property recording
law in two areas. First, how does a mortgage assignee protect its
interest in the mortgage against subsequently arising claims (how
Second, what must a
does the assignee "perfect" its interest)?
mortgage assignee do to make sure that it has the right to foreclose if
the borrower defaults on the loan?
A.

Conflicting Methods of ProtectingInterests in a Mortgage

State real-property recording laws usually provide that mortgage
assignments can be recorded,4 4 and real-property recording laws in
many states may provide that unrecorded interests in mortgages are
vulnerable to competing claims, including those of bankruptcy
trustees. However, Article 9 seems to provide that a mortgage loan
buyer's unrecorded interest in the mortgage is secure, at least from
the bankruptcy trustee, as long as certain conditions are met. Article

9 and real-property recording law thus seem to be in conflict in many
states.
To give context and help explain this conflict, we briefly describe
the nature of the problem and describe recording statutes in general.
When a property interest is transferred, the transferee will want to
protect that interest against third parties. If A transfers property to B,
B will want to be sure that C cannot come along and claim the
property, for example by purchasing outright from A or by lending
42. MERS is designed to act as a "common agent" for its members, who are key
players in the mortgage securitization industry. Mortgages are recorded in the name
of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS, Inc.") and under MERS's
theory recorded mortgage assignments are not necessary when mortgages are
transferred between MERS members because MERS, Inc. remains the legal owner at
all times. Id. at 11-12.
43. See U.C.C. §§ 9- 2 0 3 (g), 9-308(e) (2012) (discussed infra Part II.A.2); see also
REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, supranote 10, at 8-13 (explaining how
the Article 9 revisions codify the proposition that "the mortgage follows the note").
44. See 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 5.34, at 614 (asserting that there
are "very few jurisdictions in which the recording acts do not apply to mortgage
assignments"); Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-JudicialForeclosureStates:
The Ibanez Time Bomb?, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 111, 131 (2013) ("[T]he transfer

of the mortgage generally is governed by the state law of conveyance and real
property.").
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money to A and taking a security interest in the property. What B
must do to protect itself depends on the type of property and the
nature of the competing claim, as described in more detail below. B
often will be required to do something to make its claim discoverable
by third parties, such as making a public filing or taking possession of
the property. The general idea behind such a requirement is that B
should not be protected against C unless C has some way of knowing
of B's claim. In turn, C should check for the existence of conflicting
claims to the property before proceeding with the transaction.
One of the most important conflicts arises when C is a bankruptcy
trustee representing A's creditors as a group. When a party enters
bankruptcy, a trustee may be appointed to gather the party's assets
45
and administer them for the benefit of the creditors collectively.
The trustee may seek to gather assets the debtor has transferred away
to various parties. 46 Speaking generally, unrecorded real-property
interests are vulnerable to the trustee's claims,47 while perfected
interests under Article 9 of the UCC are invulnerable.4 8 As we discuss
below, an assignee's unrecorded interest in a mortgage may be
simultaneously a vulnerable unrecorded real-property interest and an
invulnerable perfected interest under Article 9.
What we have just described is a simplification of the complex law
of filing and recording. We now turn to the relevant details of the
two bodies of law relevant to mortgage recording.
1. State real-propertyrecordingrulesfor protectinginterests in mortgages
There are three major types of real-property recording statute:
"race," "notice," and "race-notice."4
Under each type, an
45. See, e.g., THOMAS H.JACKSON, THE LoGic AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTcY LAW 7 (2d
ed. 2001) (discussing bankruptcy as a collective debt-collection proceeding);
CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 5.1, at 394-97 (2d ed. 2009)
(describing the bankruptcy estate as "the 'what' in the core question of 'who gets
what' in the bankruptcy distribution" and describing the role of a bankruptcy trustee
as a representative of a bankruptcy estate).
46. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 544.01, at 544-03 (Alan N. Resnick & HenryJ.
Sommer, eds., 15th ed. 2009) (describing the trustee's power to avoid certain
transfers).
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (3) (2006) (conferring on the trustee the rights of a
hypothetical bona fide purchaser of real property). As we discuss, under the realproperty recording statutes, a bona fide purchaser can prevail over unrecorded
interests. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
48. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 46, 544.03, at 544-12 (explaining that
a security interest governed by Article 9 is vulnerable to a bankruptcy trustee's
avoidance action "[i]f the holder of the security interest.., has not taken the
necessary steps under applicable law to put other creditors on notice of the interest
by proper perfection").
49. See, e.g., 14 RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82.02[1] [b]
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2013) (identifying three types of real-property recording

1542

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1529

unrecorded interest in real property is vulnerable to a subsequent
bona fide purchaser.5 0
The recording laws often can be interpreted to apply to interests in
mortgages themselves, not just the underlying real property. In other
words, the statutes often can be read to provide that a person who
buys a mortgage or lends money and takes a mortgage as collateral is
vulnerable to subsequent claims on the mortgage itself unless that
person records its interest. These rules generally do not cover
promissory notes. Specifically, many of the states with the most
private-label securitized mortgages5 have enacted statutes arguably
providing that when a mortgage is assigned, and the assignee does
not record, the assignee's interest may be vulnerable to competing
claims to the mortgage.
Some of these states, such as California52 and Florida, 3 have
statutes that specifically mention mortgage assignments on their
statutes, under each of which recording protects ownership interest from subsequent
purchasers).
50. Id. (explaining that under a "race" statute, an unrecorded interest is
vulnerable to any subsequent purchaser who records first, under a "notice" statute,
an unrecorded interest is vulnerable to a subsequent purchaser who acquires an
interest without notice, and under a "race-notice" statute, an unrecorded interest is
vulnerable to a subsequent purchaser who acquire an interest without notice and
records first). Under a "race" or "race-notice" statute, an owner can protect itself
against subsequently arising claims by recording because subsequent purchasers win
only if they record first. Id. § 82.02[1] [c] Under a "notice" statute an owner can
protect itself against subsequent claims by recording because recording gives notice
to subsequent purchasers. Id. In addition to the three familiar types of recording
statutes, Powell recognizes a fourth type, the "period of grace" statute, under which
an owner will be protected against subsequent claims if the owner records within a
specified grace period. Id. § 82.02[1] [a]. Under all four types, an unrecorded
interest or will become vulnerable to certain subsequent purchasers. "Purchaser"
generally includes a mortgagee, as a mortgagee gives value for an interest in the
property. Id. § 82.02 [2] [b].
51. The authors compiled a list of the ten states with the most private-label
securitized mortgages from ABSNet. The states are, in order of the number of
private-label securitized mortgages: California, Florida, Texas, Illinois, New York,
Arizona, Georgia, Virginia, Michigan, and Maryland.
52. See CAL. CRT. CODE § 2934 (West 2013) ("[A] ny assignment of a mortgage and
any assignment of the beneficial interest under a deed of trust may be recorded, and
from the time the same is filed for record operates as constructive notice of the
contents thereof to all persons .... "); see also id. § 1213 (providing that the recording
provisions apply to "[e]very conveyance of real property"); Neilson v. Aguirre (In re
Cedar Funding, Inc.), No. 08-52709-MM, 2010 WL 1346365, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
Apr. 5, 2010) (providing that interests in mortgages not perfected until recorded);
Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 529, 535 (Ct. App. 1969) (allowing a
bona fide purchaser of a deed of trust from a record owner to prevail over a
competing claimant despite not receiving an associated promissory note); Sec.
Mortg. Co. v. Delfs, 191 P.53, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920) ("If [the ownership claimant]
had recorded its assignment.., its rights could have been protected.").
53. See FLA. STAT. § 701.02(1) (2005) ("An assignment of a mortgage upon real
property or of any interest therein, is not good or effectual in law or equity, against
creditors or subsequent purchasers, for a valuable consideration, and without notice,
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face.54 It is more common, however, for statutes to cover a class of
instruments that includes mortgage assignments. For example,
Illinois law provides that instruments, "which are authorized to be
recorded, shall.., be in force from and after the filing of the same
for record... as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers, without
notice, ' 5 and also provides that mortgage assignments are
instruments that can be recorded. 56 The most common pattern
appears to be for a state statute to provide that any conveyance, deed
conveying lands, or instrument affecting title to land is vulnerable,
and for a statute or judicial authority to provide or suggest that a
mortgage assignment is such a conveyance, deed, or instrument. In
57
addition to the Illinois statutes just mentioned, statutes in Texas,
New York,58 Arizona,5 9 Virginia,60 Michigan,6 1 and Maryland6" fall into
unless the assignment is contained in a document that... is recorded according to
law."); JP Morgan Chase Bank v. New Millenial, LC, 6 So. 3d 681, 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009) ("[I]f the original mortgagee assigns the mortgage to Entity A and Entity
A fails to record that assignment, Entity A cannot claim priority over a latter assignee
of the same mortgage (Entity B)."). However, FLA. STAT. § 701.02(4) provides that
perfection of security interest in note perfects security interest in mortgage
"[n]otwithstanding subsections (1), (2), and (3)." It appears that no reported
Florida court opinion discusses this provision, which was adopted in 2005. See 2005
Fla. Laws 241.
54. We discuss the mortgage assignment recording laws of California and Florida
in more detail in John Patrick Hunt, Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, U.S.
Residential-Mortgage Transfer Systems: A Data-Management Crisis, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
FINANCIAL DATA AND RISK INFORMATION 85, 118-30, (Margarita Brose et al. eds.)

(forthcoming 2013).
55.

765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/30 (1995).

56. See id. at 5/28 ("No... assignment of mortgage... may include a provision
prohibiting the recording of that instrument .. "). At least one Illinois court has
held that recording a mortgage assignment is unnecessary to protect the mortgage's
priority as against subsequently arising claims to the underlying property. See Fed.
Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Kuipers, 732 N.E.2d 723, 730 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). In another
case, the same court held that where failure to record a mortgage assignment causes
a fraud relating to the mortgage to be effective, the loss from the fraud should fall on
the party that failed to record. See Brenner v. Neu, 170 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Ill. App. Ct.
1960). It does not appear that Illinois' courts have directly addressed whether an
assignee must record a mortgage assignment to protect the assignee's interest in the
mortgage itself.
57. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (West 2012) ("A conveyance of real
property or an interest in real property or a mortgage or deed of trust is void as to a
creditor or to a subsequent purchase for a valuable consideration without notice
unless the instrument has been acknowledged, sworn to, or proved and filed for
record as required by law."); see also id. § 13.002(1) ("An instrument that is properly
recorded in the proper county is... notice to all persons of the existence of the
instrument.").
But see id. § 12.009(e) (providing that "provisions of Uniform
Commercial Code prevail" over a provision permitting recording of "master form" of
mortgage or deed of trust and incorporation by reference of master form in
subsequent filings).
58. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 291 ("A conveyance of real property... may be
recorded ....
Every such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any person
who subsequently purchases or acquires by exchange, the same real property .... ").
New York courts have treated mortgages as real-property interests, indicating that the
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this category. Among the ten states with the most private-label
securitized mortgages, Georgia is a special case. Although Georgia's
recording statute, like those just discussed, would seem to make

statute governing "conveyance[s]" of real property would apply to mortgage
assignments. See, e.g., Halstead v. Dolphy, 892 N.Y.S.2d 897, 897 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010) (treating mortgage as interest in real property); Beneficial Homeowner Serv.
Corp. v. Steele, 30 Misc. 3d 1208(A), at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) ("Distilled to its
essence, a mortgage is a conveyance of an estate in land False"); Gerow v. Sinay, 905
N.Y.S.2d 827, 831 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (treating mortgagee as party that has
"acquire [d] an interest in real property").
59. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-411 (2007) ("No instrument affecting real
property gives notice of its contents to subsequent purchasers or encumbrance
holders for valuable consideration without notice, unless recorded as provided by law
in the office of the county recorder of the county in which the property is located.");
id. § 33-706 ("An assignment of a mortgage may be recorded in like manner as a
mortgage, and the record is notice to all persons subsequently deriving title to the
mortgage from the assignor."). A mortgage assignment at least arguably "affect[s]
real property." See Buerger Bros. Supply Co. v. El Rey Furniture Co., 40 P.2d 81, 83
(Ariz. 1935) ("[A] ssignments of mortgages must be recorded as instruments affecting
real estate in order to protect the holder of such assignment against subsequent
purchasers without notice.").
60. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-96 (2012) ("Every (i) such contract in writing, (ii)
deed conveying any such estate or term, (iii) deed of gift, or deed of trust, or
mortgage conveying real estate.., shall be void as to all purchasers for valuable
consideration without notice not parties thereto and lien creditors, until and except
from the time it is duly admitted to record in the county or city wherein the property
embraced in such contract, deed or bill of sale may be."). There is no clear
explanation for "such" in the statutory text, but the immediately preceding section,
id. § 55-95, refers to "[a]ny such contract or bill of sale as is mentioned in § 11-1."
Section 11-1, in turn, refers to "[e]very contract, not in writing ....
made for the
conveyance or sale of real estate." Id. § 11-1; see also Ameribanc Sav. Banks v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 858 F. Supp. 576, 582-83 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding that
under Virginia's recording statutes, a later, but recorded, deed of trust had priority
over an unrecorded interest of an assignee of an earlier deed of trust, even though
the earlier deed of trust was recorded in the name of the original lender, where
litigants did not dispute issue).
61. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.29 (West 2013) ("Every conveyance of real
estate within the state... which shall not be recorded as provided in this chapter,
shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable
consideration, of the same real estate, whose conveyance shall be first duly
recorded."); id. § 565.34 ("The term 'purchaser' ... shall be construed to embrace
every.., assignee of a mortgage .... "); see also Qual-Prop. LLC v. Chase Manhattan
Mortg. Corp., No. 263029, 2005 WL 3501586, at *1-2 (holding that section 565.29
governs contest between claimants to ownership of mortgage interest).
62. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 3-203 (LexisNexis 2013) ("Every recorded
deed or other instrument takes effect from its effective date as against the grantee of
any deed executed and delivered subsequent to the effective date, unless the grantee
of the subsequent deed has: (1) Accepted delivery of the deed or other instrument:
(i) In good faith; (ii) Without constructive notice under § 3-202 [adverse possession];
and (iii) For a good and valuable consideration; and (2) Recorded the deed first.").
A mortgage assignment could be an "other instrument" under this statute. Maryland
has adopted a statute that may make explicit that UCC Article 9 governs mortgage
assignments. See id. § 7-101(b) ("[T]he grant of a security interest in a mortgage by a
mortgagee, or one of several mortgagees, or any assignee of his interest in a
mortgage as security for payment of an indebtedness or performance of an
obligation ... is governed by Title 9 of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code.").
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unrecorded interests in security deeds vulnerable,6 3 the state also has
that certain transfers of security deeds
a special statute that provides
"need not be recorded,"' and that priority of claims to the deed
"shall not be lessened" by failure to record.6 5 The Georgia statute
would appear to cover most transactions on the secondary market
where the transferor is the mortgage servicer.66
There appears to be at least some authority suggesting that
unrecorded mortgage assignments are vulnerable to purchasers
under the law of each of the ten states with the most private-label
securitized mortgages. This authority also suggests that unrecorded
transfers from a bankrupt debtor may be vulnerable to attack by the
bankruptcy trustee, because the bankruptcy trustee of a bankrupt
debtor stands in the shoes of a bona fide purchaser of real property
from the debtor.6 7
2.

Article 9 rulesfor protectinginterests in mortgages

In contrast to state real-property recording laws that seem to put
transferees' interests in mortgages at risk unless the interests are
recorded, the 1999 revisions to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code appear to provide that transferees can be protected against
certain third parties, including bankruptcy trustees, without any filing
anywhere if the parties to the transfer comply with certain
To use the UCC's language, under the right
requirements.

63. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-1 (2012) ("Every deed conveying lands shall be
recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county where the land
is located. A deed may be recorded at any time; but a prior unrecorded deed loses
its priority over a subsequent recorded deed from the same vendor when the
purchaser takes such deed without notice of the existence of the prior deed."). The
most common form of real-property security instrument in Georgia is the security
deed, and a security deed is treated as conveying legal title under Georgia law,
suggesting that a mortgage assignment is a "deed conveying lands" within the
recording statute. See In re Jackson, 446 B.R. 608, 609 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011)
("[A] deed to secure debt... transfers legal title."); DANIEL F. HINKEL, 2 PINDAR'S
GEORGIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PROCEDURE § 20:3 (7th ed. 2013) ("Both a mortgage
and a security deed are alike in that they contain a conveyance of land .. ").But see
Thomas v. Hudson, 10 S.E.2d 396, 400 (Ga. 1940) ("[T]he defendant assignees of
the mortgage [did not] lose their priority over the subsequent purchaser and his
predecessor in title by the fact that no assignment of the prior mortgage was
recorded.").
64. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-64(d).
65. Id. § 44-14-64(e).
66. The Georgia provisions in question cover any transfer of a security deed "by a
financial institution having deposits insured by an agency of the federal government
or a transfer by a lender who regularly purchases or services residential real estate
loans" on "one to four family dwelling units, where the transferor retains the right to
service or supervise the servicing of the deed or interest therein." Id. § 44-14-64(d).
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (3) (2006).
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circumstances the buyer's interest in the mortgage can be "perfected"
without filing.
We begin with a brief overview of protection of interests in
personal property under the UCC. 6 Speaking somewhat loosely, the
UCC concept of "perfection" captures the idea of protecting an
interest against third-party claimants: If an interest is perfected, that
interest is protected against subsequently arising claims to the
property. 69 For many (possibly most) types of property, the UCC
parallels the real-property system because the UCC requires some act
that at least theoretically provides notice to third parties in order to
perfect an interest in property.70 The most common way to provide
notice is to make a filing in the UCC filing system, although other
ways exist.7' It is also possible to perfect an interest in certain

68. Although UCC Article 9 generally focuses on "security interests," see U.C.C. §
9-109(a)(1) (2012), the UCC defines a buyer's interest in a promissory note as a
security interest. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b. The UCC's rules cover both loan
transactions in which an interest in a promissory note is taken as collateral and
outright sales of promissory notes.
69. See 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 31-4, at 149-50 (explaining that
perfection gives the perfected secured creditor priority over unperfected secured
creditors and lien creditors, including bankruptcy trustees, and that "[u]sually,
though not invariably, a creditor who perfects takes priority over secured creditors
who perfect later, yet is subordinate to those who perfected previously"). As the
quotation from White and Summers indicates, time of perfection is important in
determining priority under the UCC. But it is an oversimplification to say that an
earlier perfected interest takes priority over a later perfected interest. The UCC's
priority rules for security interests are in fact quite complicated. Disputes over
whether a transferee's interest is protected may depend, for example, on the type of
collateral and the type of competing interest. For instance, if a lender has perfected
a security interest in goods that a merchant holds in inventory, a buyer who
purchases the goods from the merchant in the ordinary course of business will take
free of the security interest even though the lender's security interest would have
priority over that of another lender who perfects later. See U.C.C. § 9-320(a); 4
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 33-8, at 358-59. Another example: If a lender
has perfected a security interest in all the goods a merchant may acquire, a seller to
the merchant who takes a purchase money security interest may achieve priority over
the first lender. See U.C.C. § 9-324; 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 33-4, at 33031. These complications do not, as far as we can tell, affect our discussion of the
interaction of real-property law with the UCC's rules for automatic perfection of
security interests in promissory notes and associated real-property mortgages.
70. See 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 31-4, at 150 (perfection "generally
requires some action... which would put a diligent searcher on notice of the
secured party's claim").
71. Id. ("[B]y far the most common and important method" of perfecting
interests under the UCC, which governs personal property, "is the filing of a
financing statement."). Nevertheless, security interests in certain types of property
(including promissory notes) also may be perfected by taking possession. See id.
Another method of perfection, available for certain intangible assets, is "control."
UCC filing has some differences from real-property recording, although we use the
terms interchangeably in this Article for convenience and because of broad
similarities between the systems. SeeJonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of
Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 421, 446-47 (2005)
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property "automatically," that is, without doing anything to provide
notice. As we explain, the UCC seems to provide that a buyer's
interest in promissory notes and mortgages can be perfected
automatically and that no filing is necessary to protect the acquiring
party's interest.
a. Brief history of Article 9's interactionwith recordingstatutes
The history of the interaction of the UCC and state real-property
recording law helps put the 1999 revisions' no-filing-required rule in
perspective. The real-property recording statutes do not apply to
promissory notes."2 Instead, the UCC has governed how security
interests in promissory notes are created and perfected. 73 However, it
never has been clear how the UCC's rules for notes interact with the
state recording statutes for mortgages when a promissory note is
Before the 1999
secured by a mortgage on real property.
amendments, the UCC seemed to cede primacy to the recording
statutes. Official74 Comments to the UCC expressly deferred, first to
"real estate law," then later to "other law," 75 on "the question of the
effect on the rights under the mortgage of delivery or non-delivery of
the mortgage or of recording or non-recording of an assignment of
the mortgagee's interest. "76
Although the UCC appeared to defer to real-property law on the
question whether an assignee had to record its interest in a mortgage
in order to protect the interest, prominent commentators resisted
this conclusion. Jan Krasnowiecki and his coauthors, for example,
argued that the mortgagor and mortgagee live in different "worlds."
According to the "different worlds" argument, state recording laws
of the mortgage which take place in the
are irrelevant to transfers
"mortgagee's world. ' 77 The recording laws govern only transactions
in the "mortgagor's world," that is, transactions in which parties take
(explaining the differences between the UCC filing system and real-property
recordation systems).
72. In fact, promissory notes may not be recorded under the laws of some states.
See, e.g., Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co., 303 P.3d 301, 316 (Or. 2013) ("Because a
promissory note generally contains no description of real property and does not
transfer, encumber, or otherwise affect the title to real property, it cannot be
recorded in land title records.").
73. See Jan Z. Krasnowiecki et al., The Kennedy Mortgage Co. Bankruptcy Case:
New Light Shed on the Position of Mortgage Warehousing Banks, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325,
329 (1982).
74. U.C.C. § 9-102(3) cmt. 4 (1958).
75. Id. § 9-102 cmt. 4 (1967). The UCC official text apparently was changed in
1966. See Krasnowiecki et al., supranote 73, at 331-32 & nn.31-32.
76. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 4 (1967).
77. Krasnowiecki et al., supra note 73, at 334.
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interests in the land from the mortgagor.'8 Some, v9 but not all,80
courts followed the "different worlds" approach and found that a
mortgage assignee did not have to comply with state recording law to
perfect its interest.
b. Article 9's provisionsfor perfecting interests in mortgages after the
1999 revisions
The 1999 amendments may have made the "different worlds"
theory unnecessary, because the revisions eliminated the Code's
language deferring to other law and inserted language seemingly
providing that a buyer's interest in a mortgage can be perfected
without recording.
Understanding the Article 9 mortgage rules after the 1999
amendments is challenging because the rules use terms in ways that
may be counterintuitive, employing the vocabulary of secured
transactions to describe sales of promissory notes and associated
mortgages.81 Thus, the buyer of a promissory note or mortgage is
called the same thing as someone who made a loan secured by the
note or mortgage: she is a "secured party." 2 The note seller is called
the same thing as someone who borrowed money and gave the note
or mortgage as security; she is the "debtor." 3 The note being sold is
called the same thing it would be called if it were given as security for
a loan: it is "collateral."8 4 Thus, in the language of Article 9, the
statement that a note buyer's interest in the mortgage is automatically
protected as soon as the buyer buys the note could be phrased: "The
secured party's security interest in the mortgage is automatically
perfected when the security interest in the associated note attaches."

78. Id.
79. See, e.g., In reSGE Funding Corp., 278 B.R. 653 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2001).
80. See, e.g., In re Maryville Sav. & Loan Corp., 743 F.2d 413, 416-17 (6th Cir.
1984) ("[T]he U.C.C. does not supercede the law in this state with respect to liens
upon real estate." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court
in Maryville held that a party's interest in deeds of trust was perfected even though its
interest in the related notes was not perfected. See id.
81. In ordinary usage, we recognize a difference between selling something and

putting it up as collateral for a loan. The UCC drafters, however, merged the two
concepts in the 1999 revisions. REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, supra
note 10, at 8-9. "Article 9 uses nomenclature conventions to apply one set of rules to
both" transactions in which notes are sold and transactions in which notes are
collateral. This decision has been criticized. See, e.g., Plank, supra note 22, at 235-37
(criticizing the Article 9 drafters for "inject[ing] an absolute conveyance of a

property interest into a security or lien statute").
82.

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(72)(D) (2011).

83. Id. §9-102(a)(28)(B).
84. Id. §9-102(a)(12)(B).
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The 1999 revisions, adopted by all fifty states by the end of 2001,
amended the UCC to provide that in the sale of a promissory note
secured by a mortgage, the security interest in the mortgage attaches
when the security interest in the note attaches,8" and that the security
interest in the mortgage is perfected when the security interest in the
note is perfected. 6 The UCC thus appears to provide that when the
note is sold, the ownership interest in the mortgage is equal to the
ownership interest in the note. As the Permanent Editorial Board
explains at some length, v the UCC provides that the mortgage
follows the note."8
The UCC also provides that the security interest in the promissory
note can attach and be perfected without any recording."9 The
security interest in the note is perfected automatically. Combining
this no-filing-for-notes provision with the mortgage-follows-the-note
provision, it seems that the UCC provides that the buyer can perfect
its interest in a mortgage without any recording or filing anywhere. °0
These special rules for automatic perfection of interests in mortgages
stand in contrast to the rules for many other interests under the
UCC, which are perfected by a making a filing, or by possession or
control. 91
The fact that a note buyer's interest in the note is perfected
automatically does not mean that the buyer will prevail over all
competing claimants. With respect to the note, if the note buyer
does not take possession, it may lose out to a subsequent note buyer
who acts in good faith.92 However, a note buyer's automatically
85. Id. § 9-203(g).
86. Id. § 9-308(e).
87. See REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, supranote 10, at8-12.
88. U.C.C. §§ 9-203 cmt. 9, 9-308 cmt. 6.
89. See id. § 9-309(4) (providing that a security interest in a note that is sold is
perfected immediately upon attachment).
90. SeeJulian B. McDonnell &James Charles Smith, Promissory Notes and Mortgages,
in SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC, supranote 10, § 16.09.
91. U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a), 9-502(a); see I JASON H.P. KRAVITr ETAL., SECURITIZATION
OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, § 6.03[B], tbl.6-1 (3d. ed. 2013) (indicating that filing,
possession, or control is needed to perfect a security interest in most types of
property); 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 31-10, at 184 ("Section 9-310(a)
identifies filing as the norm and, except when they are proceeds, there is no other

way to perfect a security interest in most accounts (as distinguished from deposit

accounts) and general intangibles.").
92. A security interest in an "instrument" is vulnerable to a subsequent good-faith
purchaser of the instrument unless the buyer takes possession of the instrument. See
U.C.C. § 9-330(d). It is not entirely clear that the subsequent good-faith purchaser of
a mortgage note would win, however. The "instruments" to which section 9-330(d)

applies are defined as "negotiable instrument[s]" or writings "of a type that in the

ordinary course of business [are] transferred by delivery with any necessary
Id. § 9-102(47).
Promissory notes secured by
indorsement or assignment."
mortgages may be "instruments," as they are designed to be negotiable. But it seems
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perfected status does seem to allow the note buyer to prevail over the
note seller's bankruptcy trustee if the seller enters bankruptcy.9"
The rules providing for automatic perfection of a note buyer's
interest in a mortgage apply only if certain conditions are met. They
apply when a security interest in the note attaches, and the UCC
contains specific requirements for attachment of such an interest.
The prerequisites for attachment of a security interest and, thus,
applicability of the Article 9 rules are: (1) the seller must have rights
(or the power to transfer rights) in the note;9 4 (2) the buyer must
give "value";95 and (3) either an authenticated security agreement
must describe the note or the buyer must possess the note.96
Problems with recordkeeping in the mortgage securitization industry
suggest that parties may not have documented their compliance with
these requirements.9 7 Parties seeking to invoke Article 9's protections
in the future should comply with the rules for attachment of an
Article 9 security interest in the note and maintain evidence of
compliance with these requirements.
3. Analyzing the conflict overprotectionof ownership interests under current
law
The real-property statutes may require a mortgage buyer to record
its interest in order to be protected against subsequent claimants,
such as bankruptcy trustees, while the UCC seems to provide that the
buyers are protected against the same claimants without recording. It
is not clear how the potential conflict between Article 9 and the state
doubtful that the mortgages themselves are "instruments" as that term is defined in
Article 9. The mortgage is not a negotiable instrument, as it is not a "promise or
order to pay a fixed amount of money" as required by U.C.C. § 3-104(a). Moreover,
it appears that "transfer[] by delivery" is in fact not customary in the mortgage
industry. See White, supra note 32, at 484-85 (describing methods used to transfer
mortgages without mentioning delivery of the mortgage); see also Dale A. Whitman,
How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Market Mortgage Market, and What To Do
About It, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 758 (2010) [hereinafter Whitman, Negotiability] (stating
that non-delivery of note is an "extremely widespread" practice in the mortgage
industry and, "in many cases, appears to have been the result of a conscious policy on
the part mortgage sellers to retain, rather than transfer, the notes representing the
loans they were selling"). If transacting parties did not deliver the notes, it seems
doubtful that they delivered the associated mortgage documents without the notes.
93. See 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 31-4, at 149-50 (explaining that
perfection gives the perfected secured creditor priority over unperfected secured
creditors and lien creditors, including bankruptcy trustees).
94. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2).
95. Id. §9-203(b)(1).
96. Id. §9-203(b) (3) (A)-(B).
97. See Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of the
Robo-Sign Scandal, 64 ME. L. REv. 18, 24-27 (2011) (summarizing issues with
recordkeeping and alleged fraud in the mortgage industry); Renuart, supra note 44,
at 119-28; White, supra note 32, at 473-76, 484 88.

2013]

REBALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

1551

recording statutes should be resolved under current law. Although
the 1999 revisions eliminated specific language in the Code's Official
Comments deferring to mortgage recording law, the revisions did not
go as far as they could have in expressing an intent to supplant that
law: language asserting that the Code's mortgage-follows-the-note
rules prevailed "notwithstanding other law" was dropped in the UCC
drafting process." Moreover, apparently only a few states amended
their recording laws to follow the new UCC regime: our research on
the ten states with the largest numbers of mortgages securitized in
private-label transactions9 9 indicates that only two states,, Florida"'
and Maryland,1"' made such amendments. Thus, the Code's rule that
mortgage ownership is perfected without recording may be in
conflict with real-property recording laws if they continue to provide
that unrecorded real-property interests are vulnerable to subsequent
claimants. The Board's Report does not address this potential
conflict, as critics of the Report have noted. 2
One might look to general provisions of the UCC to resolve the
potential conflict over what buyers must do to protect interests in
mortgages, but the UCC's general provisions seem potentially to
point in opposite directions. The UCC yields to another statute
"where the other statute was specifically intended to provide
additional protection to a class of individuals engaging in
98. Drafts of the Article 9 revisions, including the ALI Proposed Final Draft of
April 15, 1998, read, "Perfection of a security interest in a right to payment or
performance also perfects a security interest in a lien on personal or real property
securing that right, notwithstanding other law to the contrary." U.C.C. § 9-308(g)
(Proposed Final Draft 1998). However, when the official 1999 version came out, it
dropped the language "notwithstanding other law to the contrary." See id. § 9-308(e)
(1999). Other phrasing differences apparently expressed a move toward giving the
U.C.C. greater force against conflicting state law. Compare id. § 9-308 legislative note
be made expressly subject
(1999) ("Any statute conflicting with subsection (e) must
8
to that subsection." (emphasis added)), with id. § 9-30 (g) legislative note (Proposed
Final Draft 1998) ("To avoid confusion, any statute conflicting with subsection (g)
should be made expressly, subject to that subsection." (emphasis added)).
99. See supra note 51.
100. SeeFLA. STAT. § 701.02(4) (2005).
101. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-101 (LexisNexis 2013).
102. See Lawless Letter supra note 19, at 6. Despite these criticisms, there seemed
to be little disagreement over the Board's reading of the Code's text. See, e.g., E-mail
from Kenneth Kettering, Visiting Professor, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law, to Deanne
Dissinger, Assoc. Deputy Dir., Am. Law Inst. (March 30, 2011, 9:59 PM) (on file with
authors) ("The Draft Report is a lucid description of the UCC provisions that pertain
to the matters covered by the report."). However, at least one academic did take
issue with the Board's interpretation of the Code. See Letter from Bruce A.
Campbell, Professor of Law Emeritus, Toledo Coll. of Law, to Deanne Dissinger,
Assoc. Deputy Dir., Am. Law Inst. (May 27, 2011) (on file with authors) ("The Draft
Report is thus, overall, a substantial oversimplification, and an oversimplification
which distorts analysis and reaches dubious conclusions, potentially misleading
lawyers, diplomats, and courts.").
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transactions covered by the Uniform Commercial Code."1" 3 If Article
9 applies to mortgage sales, then those transactions are covered by
the Code, and the real-property recording statutes seem intended to
provide additional protection to mortgage purchasers. On the other
hand, the UCC is to be interpreted "to promote its underlying
purposes and policies," which are "to simplify, clarify, and modernize
the law," as well as "to permit the continuing expansion of
commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the
parties." 104
Eliminating any requirement to record mortgage
assignments certainly could be seen as "simplify[ing]" the law, and to
the extent that the private-label securitization industry abandoned
recording, the reference to "commercial practice[]" may support an
interpretation that recording no longer is required.
Without clear instruction in the statutory text about whether to
follow the revised Article 9 provisions where they appear to conflict
with other law, a court might attempt, in accordance with general
principles of statutory construction, to give effect to both statutes to
the extent possible. 10 5 One way of harmonizing the statutes would be
to find that the term "perfected" under the UCC is limited by state
recording statutes. State recording statutes typically protect certain
classes of persons from claims based on unrecorded property
interests. Typically, one such class consists of bona fide purchasers of
real property for value who take without notice of a competing claim
and record first. 06 A court could find that recording is required for
protection against the persons specifically mentioned in the real
property statutes, such as bona fide purchasers of real property. The
bankruptcy trustee thus could prevail over the unrecorded interest in
some states because the bankruptcy trustee is treated as a bona fide
purchaser of real-property interests.' 7 Perfection under the UCC, by
contrast, could protect the claimant against other classes of
competing claimants, such as judgment or statutory lienors (at least
in some cases)."' This interpretation gives some effect to the UCC's
103. U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 3 (2011).
104. Id. § 1-103(a).
105. See 2B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONsTRucTION § 51:2, at 202-05 (7th ed. 2012) ("Courts try to construe apparently
conflicting statutes on the same subject harmoniously, and, if possible, give effect to
every provision in both." (footnote omitted)).
106. POWELL, supra note 49, § 82.01[3].
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (3) (2006).
108. This analysis suggests that automatic perfection under Article 9 would prevail
over judgment and statutory liens if judgment and statutory lienors were not
mentioned in the real-property recording statutes and Article 9 is not preempted by
the statutes specifically governing judgment and statutory liens. See 4 WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 30-12, at 85-105 (discussing the relationship of Article 9
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automatic perfection provisions without doing violence to the
preexisting recording statutes.
However, it does significantly
undercut the UCC's provisions, because it effectively renders them
inapplicable to real property in states with conflicting statutes.
If a court found that it could not harmonize Article 9 with state
recording law as just described or in some other way, and therefore
found that the statutes were in conflict, the court presumably would
turn to general principles of statutory construction to resolve the
conflict. 109 Given the principle that the specific trumps the general,110
for example, Article 9's mortgage-follows-the-note provisions arguably
should prevail because they are more specific than the recording
statutes. In other words, the mortgage-follows-the-note provisions
should apply specifically to sales of mortgage promissory notes, and
recording statutes should generally apply to transfers of real-property
interests. However, it is not entirely clear that the UCC's mortgagefollows-the-note rules are more specific. Many states do have specific
provisions governing the recording of mortgages'
or mortgage
assignments in particular,1" 2 including statutes that specifically cover
3
recording mortgage assignments in foreclosure.
The argument can also be made that Article 9's provisions should
govern because they were enacted after the recording statutes, and
that the Article 9 revisions therefore repealed inconsistent provisions
by implication." 4 Many states' recording statutes were in force before
1999 to 2001," when state legislatures enacted the Article 9
revisions. 1 6 However, at least one state has passed legislation since

with statutes specifically governing different types of statutory and judicial liens).
109. See U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 3 (stating that resolution of any conflict between the
UCC and competing state statutes depends on "principles of statutory interpretation
that specifically address the interrelationship between statutes").
110. See 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 105, § 51:5, at 280-83 ("[I]f two statutes
conflict, the general statute must yield to the specific statute involving the same
subject ... ").
111. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.110 (2012) ("[A] deed of trust, given to secure
an indebtedness, shall be treated as a mortgage of real estate, and recorded in
full .... "); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28 (1995) ("[M]ortgages... shall be recorded in

the county in which such real estate is situated .... ").
112. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-706 (2007) ("An assignment of a mortgage
may be recorded in like manner as a mortgage .... "); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-35
(2012) (providing guidance for the applicability of mortgage recordings used to
"secure the payment of money").
113. See infta note 157 (listing statutes requiring recorded mortgage assignments
for nonjudicial foreclosure).
114. See IA SINGER & SINGER, supra note 105, § 23:9, at 449 ("A repeal may arise by
necessary implication from the enactment of a subsequent act.").
115. See POWELL, supra note 49, § 82.01 [1] [b] (describing colonial adoption of
recording laws and their extension to the Northwest Territory in 1795).
116. See supra note 10.
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2001 dealing with mortgage assignments." 7 Moreover, the fact that a
statute was enacted later does not mean that it automatically trumps
the previous statute, especially where there is no evidence that state
legislators intended to supersede the old statute' and where the
later statute did not refer explicitly to the earlier one. 9
Despite these general observations about how Article 9 and state
real-property recording statutes interact, the issue may be resolved
differently in every state, and it is unclear in most states how the
statutes in fact interact. 12 Only a few cases deal with the issue. 2'
Although some commentators appear to have assumed that Article
9's rules would prevail,12 2 one leading treatise does counsel against
117. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162(b) (requiring that the foreclosing party
file a "security instrument or assignment thereof vesting the secured creditor with
title to the security instrument" with county clerk before foreclosure sale). This 2008
law reportedly was intended to "help borrowers 'identify who has the right to
foreclose before they actually do."' Austin Hall, Mortgages, Conveyances to Secure Debt,
and Liens, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 265, 270 (2008) (quoting a Georgia legislator's
statement in House proceedings).
118. See IA SINGER & SINGER, supra note 105, § 23:9, at 462 ("As legislative intent
defines operation of a statute and divulges the purposes and limitations of the
enactment, it may establish or deny a repeal by implication."); Lawless Letter, supra
note 19, at 7 n.l1 (arguing that it is "implausible" that state legislators intended to
upset long-standing state real property law in adopting the revised Article 9).
119. See Letter from the Comm. on Legal Ops.of the Bus. Law Section of the Am.
Bar Ass'n, to the Permanent Editorial Bd. for the Unif. Commercial Code 2 (May 31,
2011) (questioning whether Revised Article 9 "would be effective to change the
requirements of real estate recording statutes without making express reference to
such statutes" and asserting that "[ulnder many states' statutory construction rules
(e.g., Washington State), passage of a statute may not automatically have the effect of
amending or reversing contrary statutory provisions without expressly referring to
the supplemental or superseded statutes").
120. See Lawless Letter, supra note 19, at 7 n.l1 (stating that the relevant revisions
of Article 9 are "utter failures" at providing clear law and thus legislatures might not
have been aware of the ramifications asserted by the Permanent Editorial Board's
Draft Report). In general, the UCC acknowledges that resolution of any conflict
depends on "principles of statutory interpretation that specifically address the
interrelationship between statutes" and defers to other statutes that are "specifically
intended to provide additional protection to a class of individuals engaging in
transactions covered by the Uniform Commercial Code." U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 3
(2011).
121. See, e.g.,
Provident Bank v. Cmty. Home Mortg. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558,
566-71 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (analyzing the conflict under New York law and resolving it
in favor of the UCC).
122. See McDonnell & Smith, supra note 90, § 16.09 ("Article 9 makes it as plain as
possible that the secured party need not record an assignment of mortgage, or
anything else, in the real property records in order to perfect its rights to the
mortgage."). This result would be consistent with the overall thrust of the Article 9
amendments, as identified by McDonnell in a different forum:
The U.C.C. specialists devoutly believe in secured credit. With appropriate
fanfare, they have introduced changes designed to make it easier for
financers to create and perfect security interests in the many different
contexts in which secured financing is used.... It is as though U.C.C.
specialists identified with secured creditors as the Clients, the Good
Guys ....
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relying exclusively on the proposition that the mortgage follows the
note-under Article 9 or otherwise-instead of recording mortgage
assignments. 123
The crucial point is that under current law,
resolution of the potential conflict between Article 9 and realproperty recording statutes is a question of state law, to be
determined under the statutory schemes of each state and in light of
each state's policies and legislative history of the relevant enactments.
The potential conflict between the statutory schemes1 24 creates
unnecessary risk for everyone concerned-mortgage buyers,
mortgage sellers, and mortgage borrowers alike.
4. Disputes in which the conflict over protection of ownership interests is
relevant
Conflicts over whether interests in mortgages are perfected may
not be overwhelmingly common, but the question of how to perfect
an interest in a mortgage in light of Article 9 has received at least a
fair amount of judicial 12 5 and scholarly 126 attention over the years. In
McDonnell, Article 9 Greedy?, supra note 10, at 241-42 (noting that there was no
organized opposition to the Article 9 revisions).
123. See2 KRAVITTETAL., supra note 91, § 16.04[A] ("[W]hether the transferee, as
owner of the note acquires all rights of the mortgagee without having to record an
assignment of the mortgage, is not entirely clear. In addition, there are reasons why
recordation of the mortgage may be wise in order for the transferee to obtain the
greatest possible rights in the mortgage and in the other ancillary loan
documents ... ").
124. Cf Recent Case, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Unanimously Voids
ForeclosureSales Because Securitization Trusts Could Not Demonstrate Clear Chains of Title to
Mortgages: U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 NE.2d 40 (Mass. 2011), 125 HARv.
L. REV. 827, 832 (2012) (arguing that there is no conflict between Massachusetts realproperty recording statutes and the UCC because the mortgage follows the note as a
"security interest" but not as a "real property interest"). The case note does not
further flesh out this intriguing suggestion.
125. See, e.g., In re Maryville Say. & Loan Corp., 743 F.2d 413, 416-17 (6th Cir.
1984) (finding it necessary to analyze security interests in note and mortgage
separately); In re Bristol Assocs., 505 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that
Article 9 governs only note, not mortgage); Landmark Land Co. v. Sprague, 529 F.
Supp. 971, 976-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (asserting that a "more compelling view" is that
Article 9 governs both mortgage and note where note is assigned as a security), rev'd
on other grounds, 701 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1982); SGE Mortg. Funding Corp. v. Accent
Mortg. Servs., Inc, (In re SGE Funding Corp.), 278 B.R. 653, 659-62 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
2001) (following the "different worlds" theory); Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v.
Shawmut Worcester Cnty. (In re Ivy Props., Inc.), 109 B.R. 10, 12-13 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1989) (analyzing perfection of security interest in mortgage under state
recording law); First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Larson (In re Kennedy Mortg. Co.), 17 B.R.
957, 957 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (adopting reasoning consistent with the "different
worlds" theory); Rucker v. State Exch. Bank, 355 So. 2d 171, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (finding that a security interest in a mortgage is governed by Florida realproperty recording statute).
126. For discussions of how Article 9 and real-property recording statutes
interacted under pre-1999 revision law, see 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY 311 (1965); Peter F. Coogan et al., The Outer Fringes of Article 9:
Subordination Agreements, Security Interest in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses,
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general, there is a continuing interest in how to perfect interests in
mortgages because transacting parties want to be sure that their
transactions have the intended effect: investors in entities that claim
to own mortgages want to be sure that the entities in fact own the
mortgages. In this section, we highlight some noteworthy situations
where mortgage perfection has become or could become an issue in
disputes over existing mortgage securitization transactions. Mortgage
perfection issues have arisen in investor litigation and could arise if
the entities operating the Mortgage Electronic Registration System
(MERS) enter bankruptcy.
a. Investor litigation
If securitization trusts' interests in mortgages are not perfected, the
resulting risks to mortgage investors may make representations about
the validity of transfers false or misleading, and investors already have
brought fraud claims based on alleged misrepresentations and
omissions about the legal validity of mortgage assignments.' 27
Moreover, parties in the securitization chain, such as mortgage
originators, sponsors, and depositors, typically give warranties that
run to mortgage-backed security (MBS) investors. 28 Some such
warranties could be breached if the mortgages turn out to be
vulnerable to competing claims due to failure to record. 2 '
b. MERS bankruptcy
Mortgage perfection also could come into play on a massive scale if
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS, Inc."), the
nominal owner of more than thirty million mortgages,'
enters
and ParticipationAgreements, 79 HARv. L. REv. 229 (1965); Peter F. Coogan & Albert L.
Clovis, The Uniform Commercial Code and RealEstate Law: Problemsfor Both the Real Estate
Lawyer and the Chattel Security Lawyer, 38 IND. L.J. 535 (1963); Murdoch K. Goodwin,
Mortgage Warehousing-A Misnomer, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 494 (1956); Krasnowiecki et al.,
supra note 73; Keith Meyer, A Potpourri of Agricultural UC. C. Issues: Attachment, Real
Estate-Growing Crops and Federalization, 12 HAMLINE L. REv. 741 (1989); Grant S.
Nelson, The Contractfor Deed as Mortgage: The Case for the Restatement Approach, 1998
B.Y.U. L. REv. 1111 (1998); Gregory M. Shaw, Security Interests in Notes and MortgagesDeterminingthe Applicable Law, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1414 (1979); Comment, An Article 9
Scope Problem-Mortgages, Leases, and Rents as Collateral, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 449
(1976).
127. See, e.g., Summons with Notice at 2-3, Sealink Funding Ltd. v. Goldman Sachs
Group, No. 652810/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 3279419.
128. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Mortg. Co. and Aames Capital Corp., Flow Mortgage
Loan Purchase and Warranty Agreement § 9.03 (Apr. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Goldman
and Aames Agreement] (stating that representations and warranties of originator
"inure to the benefit of' the sponsor and its "successors and assigns").
129. See id. § 9.02(m) ("Seller is the sole owner of record and holder of the
Mortgage Loan and the indebtedness evidenced by each Mortgage Note.").
130. Arnold Testimony, supra note 39, at 10; see also 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
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bankruptcy.13 1 When an entity enters bankruptcy, its bankruptcy
trustee has various rights to property connected with the entity, and
these rights can defeat unperfected interests belonging to third
parties. Much of the litigation over perfection of interests in property
deals with the rights of bankruptcy trustees as against various third
parties.
Understanding the issue of mortgage perfection in MERS
bankruptcy requires a brief introduction to MERS. MERS was
conceived as a substitute for recording mortgage assignments and has
been described as a national electronic database that tracks
ownership of mortgage loans.1 12 The system's members, who are
participants in the mortgage industry, can cause a mortgage to be
"registered" on MERS and publicly recorded in the name of "MERS,
Inc."'33 MERS is designed so that MERS, Inc. both is itself the
mortgagee and also acts as a common agent for all of MERS's
members, so that recording in the name of MERS, Inc. and tracking
ownership transfers on MERS makes it unnecessary to record
assignments of mortgages. 34 In theory, the public record discloses
the existence of the mortgage and the fact that MERS, Inc. holds
legal title on behalf of one of MERS's members. Private records
maintained on MERS in theory track which one of MERS's members
is the current "true" ("beneficial" or "equitable") owner. 3 Figure 2
illustrates how a mortgage securitization using MERS would work.

note 24, § 5.34, at 626 (stating that MERS "has already proven to be a remarkable
success").
131. Ownership also may be challenged in the event that the mortgage originator
or MERS, Inc. wrongfully or mistakenly assigns the mortgage to someone other than
the trust after the securitization is completed. The subsequent assignment problem
comes up in academic discussions of mortgage recording and property recording
generally. See, e.g., 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 5.34, at 614-21. Moreover,
it seems plausible that subsequent mistaken or wrongful assignments occurred on
the MERS system, as MERS, Inc. has not supervised its 20,000 certifying officers, each
capable of assigning a mortgage on MERS, Inc.'s behalf. Nevertheless, we are
unaware of actual cases of duplicate mortgage assignment and do not discuss this
issue further.
132. See Arnold Testimony, supra note 39, at 10 (describing MERS as a mortgage
assignment tracking system).
133.

See MERSCORP

HOLDINGS, INC.,

MERS®

SYSTEM RULES OF MEMBERSHIP,

r.2

(2013).
134. Arnold Testimony, supranote 39, at 48.
135. Under MERS's current rules, in the event of foreclosure, MERS, Inc. assigns
the mortgage to the foreclosing party so that that party has legal title at the time of
foreclosure. See MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 133, r.8. Prior to a rule
change in summer 2011, MERS, Inc. would foreclose in its own name.
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Figure 2: Mortgage and promissory note transferwith MERS recording

MERS, Inc. faces threats to its solvency on a number of fronts. As
operational problems at MERS have become public," 6 officials have
become increasingly hostile to the system.137
Federal banking
regulators determined in 2011 that MERS, Inc. and its corporate

136. A review of foreclosure documents commissioned by the Assessor-Recorder of
the City and County of San Francisco concluded that MERS apparently was wrong
about the identity of the mortgage owner more than half of the time and that
mortgages recorded on MERS generally had a higher rate of other compliance
problems that non-MERS mortgages.

AEQUITAS COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS, INC., supra

note 33, at 13-14. Specifically, Aequitas reviewed 382 residential foreclosure sales in
San Francisco from January 2009 to October 2011. Id. at 1. In 192 cases, the security
instruments were recorded on MERS, and MERS purported to have information
about the mortgage owners (or "Beneficiaries under the Deed of Trust" in California
parlance). Id. at 10, 13. In 112 of these cases, or 58%, the beneficiary recorded on
MERS was different from the beneficiary named in the Trustee's Deed upon Sale,
the document transferring ownership of the foreclosed property to the new owner at
the foreclosure sale. Id. at 13.
137. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Maria Cantwell, Cantwell to Justice
Department: Fully Investigate Fraudulent Foreclosures Before Bank Settlement
(Dec.
15,
2011),
available
at
http://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=335169 (announcing a letter
Senator Maria Cantwell sent to Attorney General Eric Holder, which asserted that
MERS "should be dissolved and shut down").
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parent MERSCORP, Inc. employed "unsafe or unsound practices,
and as a result, the companies operate under a federal consent
decree that requires operational improvements3 9 and potential
additional capital contributions from MERS's members." 4 It remains
unclear whether the companies will be able to meet the requirements
of the decree.
MERS also faces lawsuits from county recorders who assert that
MERS's claims to be a mortgagee or beneficiary under a deed of trust
are fraudulent under state recording law, 141 from state attorneys
general who claim that the MERS entities' conduct in foreclosure
litigation was fraudulent, 4 2 and from private borrowers who claim to
have been injured by the MERS entities' allegedly fraudulent conduct
143
in claiming to be a mortgagee or beneficiary under a deed of trust.

1 44
These lawsuits could send MERS, Inc. into bankruptcy.
If MERS, Inc. enters bankruptcy, a bankruptcy trustee with the
powers of both ajudgment creditor of MERS, Inc.'4 5 and a bona fide
purchaser of real-property interests from MERS, Inc."4 will be
appointed to administer MERS, Inc.'s bankruptcy estate for the
benefit of creditors. The MERS, Inc. bankruptcy trustee could seek
to bring the securitized mortgages that the company nominally owns

138. See In re MERSCORP, Inc., OCC No. AA-EC-11-20, 2011 WL 2411344, at *1
(U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Apr. 13, 2011) (consent order).
139. See id. at *3-5.
140. Id. at *4.
141. See Transcript of Motions Hearing at 81, Dallas County v. MERSCORP, Inc.,
No 3:11-CV-3722-O (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2012) (denying a motion to dismiss as to
recorders' claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, conspiracy,
and violation of Texas's allegedly mandatory recording statute).
142. Summons at 6, People v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 0002768-2012
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb 3, 2012), 2012 WL 361985. Alleged foreclosure misconduct often
includes proceeding in which MERS, Inc. lacked standing because it did not hold the
promissory note but falsely claimed to hold, own, or possess the note. Id. at 18-20.
143. MERS, Inc. generally has been successful in beating these lawsuits. See, e.g.,
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011)
(upholding the dismissal of purported class action alleging fraud and consumer
protection violations in use of MERS); In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. (MERS)
Litig., No. 09-2119-JAT, 2011 WL 4550189, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2011) (dismissing
seventy-two consumer-fraud cases against MERS). However, a recent decision of the
Washington Supreme Court opened the door to consumer actions in that state by
finding that designating MERS, Inc. as the beneficiary of a deed of trust
presumptively satisfies the "deception" and "public interest impact" elements of a
private cause of action under Washington's Consumer Protection Act. See Bain v.
Metro. Mortg. Grp., 285 P.3d 34, 51 (Wash. 2012) (en banc).
144. This could happen if large judgments are entered against MERS, Inc., the
company does not pay them, and creditors start an involuntary bankruptcy
roceeding. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). MERS, Inc. also could become
ankrupt by settling some lawsuits and losing others or simply if its backers decide to
stop paying its apparently considerable legal bills.
145. See id. § 544(a)(1)-(2).
146. See id. § 544(a) (3).
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into its bankruptcy estate and administer the mortgages along with
the other estate property for the benefit of MERS, Inc.'s creditors.
Thus, whether unrecorded interests in the mortgages were
nevertheless protected under Article 9,147 could determine the fate of
over thirty million mortgages.
c.

Recorderlitigation

Article 9's provisions on the relation between mortgage and note
may be raised in lawsuits in which county recorders seek to recover
for the nonpayment of mortgage assignment fees. We discuss two
contexts in which the Article 9 provisions may be raised, although we
conclude that the provisions do not appear relevant.
First, some state statutes appear on their face to require that
mortgage assignments be recorded. 148 Instead of creating incentives
to record by providing that unrecorded ownership interests are
vulnerable or that recording is a prerequisite to foreclosure, these
statutes may simply require recording. The decision not to record
assignments in mortgage securitizations has led to litigation over
whether industry participants who did not record mortgage
assignments violated such statutes. 149 As we read Article 9, it does not
purport to, and does not, supplant state laws that flatly require
mortgage assignment recording. Although complying with the
requirements of Article 9 may help transaction participants perfect
their interests and preserve their right to foreclose without recording,

147. See Hunt, Stanton & Wallace, supra note 28, at 22-25 (discussing the legal
arguments for the mortgages becoming part of MERS, Inc.'s bankruptcy estate).
148. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28 (1995) ("Deeds, mortgages, powers of
attorney, and other instruments relating to or affecting the title to real estate in this
state, shall be recorded in the county in which such real estate is situated ....
");21
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 351 (West 2013) ("All ...conveyances.., shall be recorded
in the office for the recording of deeds ....
");TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §
192.007(a) (West 2012) ("To... transfer... an instrument that is filed, registered,
or recorded in the office of the county clerk, a person must file, register, or record
another instrument relating to the action in the same manner as the original
instrument was required to be filed, registered, or recorded."); see also Pines v.
Farrell, 848 A.2d 94, 101 (Pa. 2004) (construing "property transfer" as including
mortgage assignments). Arizona requires that the transferor either record an
assignment or "indemnify the transferee in any action in which the transferee's
interest... isat issue." ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-411.01 (2007).
149. See, e.g., Union Cnty., Ill. v. MERSCORP, Inc., Civ. No. 12-665-GPM, 2013 WL
359366, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2013) (finding no mandatory duty to record under
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28); Montgomery Cnty., Pa. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp.
2d 436, 443-45 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (holding that 21 PA. CONS. STAT. § 351 requires
recording of mortgage assignments); In reVasquez, 266 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Ariz. 2011)
(en banc) ("Read in its entirety, § 33-411.01 does not impose a recording
requirement.... Rather, the statute presents a transferor of a real property interest
with options and consequences ...").
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Article 9 will not cure a failure to record mortgage assignments where
recording is required.
Second, some county recorder lawsuits advance the theory that
failing to record a mortgage assignment causes the mortgage to lose
priority relative to other claims on the underlying real property.15 As
the Article 9 provisions we discuss deal with rights to the note and
mortgage, rather than rights to the underlying property, the
provisions do not seem relevant to this theory.
B.

ConflictingMortgage ForeclosureRules

Some state statutes seemingly provide that a chain of recorded
mortgage assignments is a prerequisite to foreclosure. At the same
time, Article 9 can be read to provide that a mortgage owner may
foreclose without a recorded chain of assignments if certain
conditions are met. Thus, Article 9 and real-property recording law
may be in conflict, at least in some states.
1. Article 9 rulesfor foreclosure
Article 9's rules governing ownership of mortgages, discussed
above, may bear on who has standing to foreclose. The standing
issue relates to whether the foreclosing party has a sufficient interest
in the mortgage to be permitted to proceed under state law."'
Because Article 9's mortgage-follows-the-note rules seem to provide
that the note buyer is in effect the mortgage owner, they may help
determine whether the mortgage owner has standing to proceed.'52
We are not aware that these Article 9 rules create a conflict with other
state law.
Article 9 contains additional rules specifically directed to
procedures for foreclosure that do seem to conflict with other state
law, at least in some states. This separate set of Article 9 rules
provides that "[i]f necessary to enable a [buyer] to enforce the
mortgage nonjudicially," a note buyer may record a copy of the sale
150. See, e.g., Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 30, Cnty. of
Washington, Pa. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 2011-7095 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Washington
Cty., Nov. 15, 2012) (holding that U.S. Bank was unjustly enriched by asserting that
mortgages with unrecorded assignments have priority over other competing liens on

mortgaged property).

151. For an example of a case dealing with the issue of standing to foreclose, see
U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53-54 (Mass. 2011) (rejecting an argument
that because the foreclosing parties "held the mortgage note, they had a sufficient
financial interest in the mortgage to allow them to foreclose").
152. See, e.g., Permanent Editorial Board, supranote 10, at 12 & n.43 (arguing that
the Ibanez decision to reject the view that holding the note in itself confers standing
to foreclose "disregards the impact of Article 9").
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agreement and an affidavit stating that a default has occurred and
that the buyer is entitled to enforce the mortgage nonjudicially.'5 3
According to the UCC official commentary, this provision is intended
to permit the buyer to become the "assignee of record" in states
where only an assignee of record can use nonjudicial foreclosure.15 4
Although the Permanent Editorial Board discusses the procedure
set forth in Article 9,155 the procedure apparently has never been
used in a case generating a reported opinion. 56 Moreover, the
Code's procedure seems to be in conflict with laws in some states that
expressly require a recorded chain of assignments as a prerequisite to
foreclosure.
State real-propertyrecordingrulesfor foreclosure
A number of state statutes appear on their face to require recorded
assignments for nonjudicial foreclosure.15 7 For example, California
Civil Code section 2932.5 provides, "The power of sale may be
exercised by the assignee if the assignment is duly acknowledged and
159
Courts in some states, including Minnesota,
recorded."158
California,16 ° and Oregon' have issued decisions circumventing such
2.

153. U.C.C. § 9-607(b) (2011).
154. Id. § 9-607, cmt. 8.
155. SeeREPORTOFTHEPERMANENTEDITORIALBOARD, supra note 10, at 13-14.
156. AJuly 6, 2013, advanced search in WestlawNext for <(assignee /s record)
& (9-607)> returned no case results.

See e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2932.5 (West 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.3204(3) (LexisNexis 2004); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 580.02(3) (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-313(1) (2011); OR.
REV. STAT. § 86.735 (1) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-48-2 (2004). At least
one other statute requires that at least a single "assignment" be recorded. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 44-14-162(b) (2012) ("The security instrument or assignment thereof
vesting the secured creditor with title to the security instrument shall be filed prior to
the time of sale in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county in which
the real property is located.").
158. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2932.5. "Power of sale" is the California vehicle for
See 1 BERNHARDT, supra note 25, § 2.14 ("No security
nonjudicial foreclosure.
instrument can be foreclosed extrajudicially unless it expressly authorizes such a
procedure in a power of sale clause.").
159. SeeJackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 502 (Minn.
2009).
160. Although section 2932.5 of the California Civil Code provides, "The power of
sale may be exercised by [an] assignee if the assignment is duly acknowledged and
recorded," California's state courts have interpreted the statute to cover only
mortgages and not deeds of trust. See, e.g., Herrera v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Corp., 141
Cal. Rptr. 3d 326, 338 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied, No. S203718, 2012 Cal. LEXIS
7643 (Aug. 8, 2012); see also Haynes v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 34
(Ct. App. 2012) (stating that the proposition that § 2932.5 applies "only to mortgages
is well settled"), review denied, No. S202996, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 7371 (Aug. 8, 2012);
Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 818 (Ct. App. 2011) (noting
that it was established in 1908 that the statute applied to mortgages only), review
denied, No. S197440, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 42 (Jan. 4, 2012); Stockwell v. Barnum, 7. Cal.
App. 413, 417 (Dist. Ct. App. 1908) (establishing and explaining why the statute
157.

1505(1) (2003);
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requirements in the past few years, but courts in other states,
including Michigan 16 2 and Georgia 163 have enforced requirements

that mortgage assignments be recorded as a prerequisite to
foreclosure.
Recent legislation in California may restore the requirement of a
chain of assignments in that state. The California Homeowners' Bill
of Rights,"6 which became law on January 1, 2013, provides that a
notice of default may not be recorded on a first lien mortgage or
deed of trust until the foreclosing party provides a statement to the
borrower disclosing, among other things, the borrower's right to
request "[a] copy of any assignment, if applicable, of the borrower's
mortgage or deed of trust required to determine the right of the
'
mortgage servicer to foreclose."165
3.

Analyzing the foreclosure conflict under current law

The interaction of Article 9 with state foreclosure law must be
evaluated separately under the statutory scheme of each state.166 In
applies only to mortgages). As deeds of trust are far more common than true
mortgages in the state, this interpretation effectively guts the rule. See In re Cruz, 457
B.R. 806, 816-18 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (noting the prevalence of deeds of trust and
questioning courts' reliance on Stockwells "archaic" analysis). Until Calvo, it was
widely believed that the distinction between mortgages and deeds of trust embraced
in Stockwell had been eliminated. See, e.g.,
Bank of It. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v.
Bentley, 20 P.2d 940, 945 (Cal. 1933). Some bankruptcy courts in California
continue to read the statute to cover deeds of trust. See, e.g., In re Cruz, 457 B.R. at
818. However, district courts have reversed such rulings. See, e.g., In re Salazar, 470
B.R. 557, 562 (S.D. Cal. 2012), revg 448 B.R. 814 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011); cf.
Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A., 885 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (denying
a motion to dismiss a wrongful foreclosure claim based in part on section 2932.5 but
expressly declining to address the provision).
161. See Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co., 303 P.3d 301, 315-19 (Or. 2013) (holding
that OR. REVT. STAT. § 86.735(1) requires only that formal, written assignments of a
mortgage be recorded as a prerequisite to nonjudicial foreclosure and that the
statute does not require recording of mortgage transfers that result from operation
of the principle "the mortgage follows the note").
162. See Kim v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 825 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Mich. 2012)
("[A]s a general matter, a mortgagee cannot validly foreclose on a mortgage by
advertisement before the mortgage and all assignments of that mortgage are duly
recorded."). Under Kim, a borrower may not set aside a foreclosure sale because of
failure to record mortgage assignments unless the borrower can show prejudice
arising from the failure to record. Id. at 337.
163. See, e.g., Stubbs v. Bank of Am., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1270 (N.D. Ga. 2012)
(finding that the purpose of Georgia statute requiring recording as a prerequisite to
nonjudicial foreclosure is to give the borrower notice of "the entity to whom the debt
is owed").
164. 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. AB 278 & SB 900 (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2920.5
et seq. (West 2013)).
165. CAL. CiV. CODE § 2923.55.
Depending on the interpretation of "any
assignment, ifapplicable... required to determine the right," id., this provision may
or may not require a recorded chain of assignments. As of lateJuly 2013, it does not
appear that any published opinion has analyzed this provision.

166. State foreclosure law is heterogeneous. For example, just over half of states
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general, where a statute that protects borrowers specifically requires
recording as a prerequisite to foreclosure, Article 9's provision for
recording a copy of a single note sale agreement should not trump
this requirement.
Statutes requiring a recorded chain of assignments as a
prerequisite to foreclosure seem to provide meaningful protections
to borrowers,'6 7 despite the fact that some courts interpreting their
states' chain-of-assignment rules have declined to address the issue of
borrower protection.168

The requirement of a recorded chain of

assignments permits the borrower to understand and test the
foreclosing party's claim that it can enforce the mortgage. 69 This is
allow nonjudicial foreclosure, with the others requiring judicial involvement. See
Nidayv. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 284 P.3d 1157, 1169 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (listing twentyeight states that have enacted statutes permitting nonjudicial foreclosure); Robert
Hockett, Six Years on and Still Counting: Sifting Through the Mortgage Mess, 9 HASTINGS
Bus. L.J. 373, 397 (2013) ("About 30 states permit 'power of sale,' or 'nonjudicial'
foreclosure instead of or in addition to judicial foreclosure."). There is authority
from at least one state, California, to the effect that some provisions of the UCC are
irrelevant to foreclosure. See Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 138 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 830, 835-36 (Ct. App. 2012) (stating that the borrower's reliance on a UCC
Article 3 note transfer provisions was "misplaced" in nonjudicial foreclosure
proceeding). Debrunneraddressed only Article 3 of the UCC, not Article 9.
167. See, e.g, Anita Lynn Lapidus, What Really Happened: Ibanez and the Case for
Using the Actual Transfer Documents, 41 STETSON L. REv. 817, 833 (2012)
(recommending that foreclosure defense attorneys "insist on reviewing the schedules
of the [pooling and servicing agreement] to compare and contrast the assignments
with important details, such as closing dates").
168. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 492,
501-02 (Minn. 2009) (stating that it would be outside the court's role to consider
policy arguments and holding that the use of MERS satisfies the state requirement
that "all assignments" of a mortgage be recorded in order to foreclose because the
recording requirement covers only legal and not equitable assignments).
Cf
Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co., 303 P.3d 301, 317-18 (Or. 2013) (finding that the
legislature "did not clearly express" an intent to provide borrower with ability to
determine whether person giving notice of foreclosure possesses the beneficial
interest in the trust deed at issue and has the right to foreclose). More generally,
courts are divided over whether laws requiring or encouraging public records of
mortgage ownership protect the borrower or only prospective purchasers. Compare
Haynes v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 37 (Ct. App. 2012) (arguing that
the purpose of the state statute's recording requirement is to ensure the prospective
purchaser is knowledgeable about who possesses authority to sell), review denied, No.
S202996, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 7371 (Aug. 8, 2012), with Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., 285
P.3d 34, 51 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (noting that a borrower may be injured by
concealment of the complete chain of title if she needs to "deal with the holder of
the note to resolve disputes or to take advantage of legal protections," or if "there
have been misrepresentations, fraud, or irregularities in the proceedings, and...
the... borrower cannot locate the party accountable and with authority to correct
the irregularity").
169. Questionable behavior by foreclosing parties highlights the borrower's
interest in testing foreclosing parties' claims. See Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 867, 869-70 (2013) (citing examples of foreclosure attorneys'
alleged misconduct, such as changing affidavits without servicers' knowledge, filing
false lost-note claims, and signing documents on behalf of servicers without authority
to do so).
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true even when the right to enforce the note can be separated from
ownership of the note, as the UCC permits. For example, consider
the following situation: Forecloser is trying to foreclose on a
property. Forecloser is not the original payee on the negotiable
promissory note and the note does not have a chain of endorsements.
The UCC apparently provides that Forecloser can enforce the note as
long as there is a chain of transfers from the original payee to
Forecloser, each made with intent to give the transferee the right to
enforce the note. 7 ° The borrower may wish to probe whether such a
chain of transfers with the requisite intent in fact happened, but may
decide not to do so if Forecloser is the record mortgage owner. The
recorded assignment provides some degree of comfort that
Forecloser did not, say, find the promissory note lying on the ground.
The preceding example involved a negotiable note; the borrower's
interest in tracing a chain of title is even clearer for nonnegotiable
notes. The UCC provides clear rules permitting separation of
ownership from the right to enforce negotiable notes. 7' Under these
rules, it is at least arguable that the borrower should not care who
owns the note, only who can enforce it. But in the case of a
nonnegotiable note, there are no such clear rules in the UCC,' 72 and
it is harder to argue that the buyer is indifferent as to who owns the
note.
Beyond the potential relevance of record ownership of the
mortgage to the right to enforce the note, there is the possibility that
additional procedural hurdles to nonjudicial foreclosure may be
appropriate even when the right to enforce the note is undisputed.
Nonjudicial foreclosure is special precisely because it involves taking
a valuable asset without judicial involvement. Courts might well
pause before concluding that the legislature cast aside protections
173
against the use of this extraordinary remedy.
170.

See REPORT OF THE PERMANENT ED1TORIAL BOARD, supranote 10, at 5-7 & illus. 3.

171. See id. at 8 & n.28.
172. See Dale A. Whitman, Foreclosingon Nothing: The Curious Problem of the Deed of
Trust Foreclosure Without Entitlement To Enforce the Note, 66 ARK, L. REV. 21, 29 n.31
(2013) (arguing that the transfer of the right to enforce nonnegotiable notes "is
governed by the common law, and there are few modern cases explicating it"). In
such cases the borrower's interest in understanding the chain of mortgage ownership
seems even stronger.
173. See generally David A. Dana, Why Mortgage "Formalities" Matter, 24 LoY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 505, 507-08 (2012) (arguing that mortgage formalities "provide
some protection to borrowers/homeowners" and that procedural hurdles to
foreclosure encourage responsible lending); Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in
the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U. L. REV. 389, 425-26 (2013) (noting that the
"increasingly predominating" view that "the revival of procedural regularity" reflects
a "recognition that the underlying asset, the borrower's home, is both fraught with
symbolic meaning and genuinely represents a locus for financial and social capital,
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It might be argued that requiring public recording does not
protect the borrower any more than simply requiring that evidence of
the chain of assignments be presented in some form. But the
requirement that mortgage assignments be recorded helps combat
fraud against the borrower because recording false documents
generally carries penalties' 7 4 and creating a public record makes the
chain of title available for public scrutiny. The Article 9 procedure
does not provide equivalent protection to borrowers. Recording a
single assignment, as the Article 9 procedure mandates, does not
supply the complete chain of title and increases the risk of fraudulent
claims.
4.

Disputes in which the foreclosure conflict is relevant
Article 9 is potentially relevant to foreclosure litigation in several
respects. As discussed, Article 9 may help foreclosing parties establish
standing175 and, potentially, overcome statutes that on their face seem
to require a complete chain of recorded mortgage assignments as a
prerequisite to foreclosure. Moreover, when transacting parties
comply with Article 9's requirements and describe the transfer of the
note in a security agreement, doing so seems to provide an argument
17 6
that the parties have satisfied the Statute of Frauds.
individual identity, and community belonging," while also expressing concern that
emphasizing mortgage formalities may distract from substantive responses to the
foreclosure crisis).
174. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-420 (2007) (naming penalties that range
from a minimum fine of $5,000 to liability for damages to charges of a class one
misdemeanor); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2921.13(13) (LexisNexis 2003) (naming
penalties such as a class one misdemeanor and a felony in the fifth degree).
175. This Article distinguishes the case where a statute affirmatively requires a
chain of recorded assignments from the case where a borrower argues that the
foreclosing party lacks standing to foreclose when the foreclosing party cannot
produce such a chain, even when the foreclosing party can show that it has been
assigned the note. See, e.g.,
In re Mann, 907 F.2d 923, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting
that in a foreclosure situation, the filing of bankruptcy will trigger a stay, which
would then have to be lifted in order for the foreclosure to proceed); In re Alcide,
450 B.R. 526, 536-37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (determining whether an entity is a
"party of interest" based on whether it is the mortgage "holder" and thereby treating
holder status as equivalent to ownership). The argument that a foreclosing party
must affirmatively demonstrate an assignment of the mortgage even if it can show
that it has been assigned the note was accepted in the high-profile case of U.S. Bank
Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011), which appears to have prompted the
Permanent Editorial Board's Report. Article 9's "mortgage follows the note"
provisions seem to give the foreclosing party a strong argument that it should not
have to prove assignment of the mortgage separately from assignment of the note.
Similarly, complying with Article 9 by describing the note and mortgage in a security
agreement seems to furnish a strong argument that the parties complied with state
statutes of frauds.
176. But see Leyva v. Nat'l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1279-80 (Nev.
2011) (requiring a separate written assignment of mortgage to comply with the
statute of frauds).
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Apart from the obvious potential relevance to foreclosure
litigation, Article 9's foreclosure rules and their interaction with
other state foreclosure law could be relevant to investor litigation. As
discussed previously, securitization arrangers gave warranties that run
to MBS investors. 177 These warranties sometimes included promises
that securitized mortgages were enforceable. 7 To the extent that
Article 9's procedure aids mortgage enforcement, it will help
arrangers defend against investors' claims for breach of warranty.
III. THE NEED FOR REFORM AND THE VALUE OF PUBLIC TITLE RECORDS

It is unclear how Article 9 of the UCC interacts with state laws
governing mortgage recording. One result of the lack of clarity is
that transacting parties and others have poor guidance as to their
rights and responsibilities, as discussed above.'79
The legal
uncertainty may be one of the reasons that private-label mortgage
securitization has not rebounded in the United States.'
One way to clarify the law would be for states to amend their title
recording and foreclosure statutes to cede primacy to Article 9,
embracing a regime based on identification of promissory notes in
private contracts rather than public recording or filing. When the
UCC was first being considered, it was assumed that laws inconsistent
with or displaced by the UCC would have to be repealed
affirmatively.'
As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that
widespread amendments of other statutes to conform to the UCC will
177. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Goldman and Aames Agreement, supra note 128, § 9.03; see also
id. § 9.02(j) ("The Mortgage is a valid, subsisting, enforceable and perfected...
lien ...on the Mortgaged Property."); id. § 9.02(u) ("Upon default by a Mortgagor
on a Mortgage Loan and foreclosure on, or trustee s sales of, the Mortgaged
Property pursuant to the proper procedures, the holder of the Mortgage Loan will
be able to deliver good and merchantable title to the Mortgaged Property.").
179. See discussion supra Part II.
180. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, and the Real
Estate Sector, 32 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 179, 188, 190 (2012) (characterizing the future
of the private residential mortgage securitization market as "hard to predict" and
"uncertain"). Another potential obstacle to the revival of private-label securitization
is uncertainty around credit-rating agency reform. See Yesha Yadav, The Problematic
Case of Clearinghousesin Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 399-400 (2013) (arguing
that reduced originator incentives to monitor quality of securitized loans leads to
increased reliance on rating agencies).
181. See, e.g., STATE OF N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N, REPORT RELATING TO THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 77-78 (1956) ("Enactment of the Uniform Commercial

Code as part of the law of New York will obviously require the repeal of many existing
laws.... [P] reparation of such a repealer section demands a survey of all the statute
law of the state ... in order that all inconsistent provisions may be discovered and
appropriately handled."). This discussion appears under the heading, "Repeals and
Amendments That Would Be Required in Connection With Enactment of the Code."
Id. at 77.
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happen in the near future, as the trend in state legislation since the
beginning of the foreclosure
crisis has been toward more emphasis
18 2
on recording, not less.

However, this Article questions whether Article 9's private regime is
a good idea to begin with. 8 To the extent the Article 9 rules obviate
mortgage assignment recording, 84 they save the transacting parties
time and money, but they do so at the expense of public records of
mortgage ownership. As discussed, mortgage ownership records can
benefit the borrower who wants to know who owns the borrower's
mortgage when negotiating a loan modification or contesting a
foreclosure.185 Mortgage ownership records also can benefit parties
in the mortgage business. As many scholars have pointed out,
authoritative systems for verifying property ownership can8 6improve
efficiency for transacting and potentially transacting parties.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.55(b) (1) (B) (iii) (West Supp. 2013) (requiring
182. See, e.g.,
servicers to advise borrowers of their right to request "a copy of any assignment, if
applicable, of the borrower's mortgage or deed of trust required to demonstrate the
right of the mortgage servicer to foreclose"). Nevada's recording act, which was
amended in 2011, provides:
Any assignment of a mortgage of real property... must be recorded in the
office of the recorder of the county in which the property is located .... If
the beneficial interest under a deed of trust has been assigned, the trustee
under the deed of trust may not exercise the power of sale.., unless and
until the assignment is recorded ....
NEV. REV. STAT. § 106.210 (2011).
183. Privatization of information has been criticized in fields other than mortgage
law. For example, the privatization of litigation settlements has been criticized for its
effect on the public record. See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The
End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6, 8 (2004) (positing that private settlements erode
norms created by public laws).
184. See Philip H. Ebling & Steven 0. Weise, What a Dirt Lawyer Needs to Know About
New Article 9 of the UCC, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 191, 213 (2002) ("Neither filing
nor possession is necessary or effective to perfect the security interest."); McDonnell
& Smith, supra note 90, § 16.09 ("Revised Article 9 makes it as plain as possible that
the secured party need not record an assignment of mortgage, or anything else, in
the real property records in order to perfect its rights in the mortgage.").
185. See Stubbs v. Bank of Am., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1270 (N.D. Ga. 2012)
(noting that the purpose of the Georgia's requirement of recorded assignment as a
prerequisite to foreclosure is to increase transparency and clarity in order "to avert
any avoidable foreclosures.., and to protect the integrity of Georgia's real property
records"); Brescia, supra note 97, at 21-22 (describing recording statutes as an
"important mechanism for protecting the rightful claims of lenders, borrowers, and
third-parties"); White, supra note 32, at 494 ("In moving away from the old paper
endorsement and delivery of note plus recorded mortgage assignment system, there
are important consumer protection interests at stake."). Looking beyond the United
States, it appears that Chinese law requires that a foreclosing party be the registered
owner of the mortgage. See Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. & Lou Jianbo, Chinese RealEstate
Mortgage Law, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 515, 546 (1999) (describing the Chinese
mortgage registration system and rule that a mortgage assignee must change
mortgage registration to be confident of its ability to enforce a mortgage).
186. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the
Transfer of Property, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 303-04 (1984) (arguing that registrationbased proof-of-ownership systems are superior to possession-based systems for
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But we emphasize that apart from the benefit to parties directly
involved in mortgage transactions (borrowers and mortgage buyers
and sellers), there is a more general public interest in public
records.187 This public interest should be taken into account in
deciding what incentives should exist for public mortgage recording,
and it is not clear that the public interest has been given proper
weight in the past. 88
Such a public interest seems implicit in established views of the
recording system. Courts have recognized a public interest in
encouraging recording, 189 and commentators19 ° and courts 91 have
valuable, nonfungible, immobile property that does not need to be transferred
frequently and for which divided ownership is important); Douglas Baird & Thomas
Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L.

REv. 175, 187 (1983) (asserting that the argument that transaction parties "should be
able to allocate ownership rights between themselves as they please... loses force
when at stake are the rights of a third party who asserts a competing claim to the
property"). But see Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209,
211 (1989) (arguing that a contractual-allocation system-such as that of Article 9Schwartz's
is equally effective and less expensive than a filing requirement).
argument is based on the idea that a borrower (analogous to a mortgage seller) can
credibly disclose the absence of debt (analogous to the absence of a prior sale of the
mortgage) using SEC filings and tax returns. See id. at 220-21. This argument does
not apply in any clear way to the mortgage market, however, where SEC filings and
tax returns do not disclose the sale vel non of individual mortgage loans.
187. This interest apparently has not always been benign. For example, Plymouth
Colony apparently used title records "to keep out undesirable immigrants" in the
160 0 s. Joseph A. Beale, Jr., The Origin of the System of Recording Deeds in America, 19
GREEN BAG 335, 335 (1907).

188. The same is true for drawbacks of public recording other than the immediate
costs to transacting parties, such as the privacy issues discussed below. See infra notes
205-208 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding against
defrauded investors in real property because they failed to record their interest);
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ark.
2009) (holding that the foreclosing party is "entitled to rely upon" the record and
that permitting MERS to participate in a foreclosure action without being directed to
do so by a recorded lender "would wreak havoc on notice"); Landmark Nat'l Bank v.
Kesler, 216 P.3d 158, 169 (Kan. 2009) (criticizing MERS for "creat[ing] a system in
which the public has no notice of who holds the obligation on a mortgage"); Jackson
v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 504 (Minn. 2009) (Page, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that the purpose of the state statute requiring recording of
mortgage assignments "was to make the contents of the mortgage, and, so far as the
statute goes, to make the tide to the mortgage, matters of record" because of the
importance "to subsequent incumbrancers, creditors, and contemplating purchasers,
that some permanent and accessible evidence of the existence and contents of the
mortgage, and of the title to the same, should be provided." (quoting Backus v.
Burke, 51 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Minn. 1892))); MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861
N.E.2d 81, 86, 88 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, J., dissenting in part) (questioning the
majority's decision to require county clerks to record documents listing MERS as
nominee mortgagee because "the MERS system will render the public record
useless").
190. See, e.g., SHELDON F. KuRTz, MOYNIHAN'S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 225 (5th ed. 2011) (listing the first function of a recording system as
"provid[ing] a public place where interested parties can search for documents
affecting land titles"); 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATRON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 4, at
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long agreed that one major function of recording statutes is to create
a public record of land ownership that makes information available
to anyone who needs it.
Contemporary commentary likewise recognizes a public interest in
public records. One recent article argues that "all ... who wish to rely
on the [mortgage] as an element of their transactions will need to
determine exactly what is owned and whether the one claiming to
2
own it truly owns

it.

1°

We concur, and would expand the focus beyond "transactions," at
least as narrowly defined. Public real estate records, including
mortgage records, are used not only by transactors and potential
transactors in land but also by reporters,1"3 academics, 19 4 political
opposition researchers,'9 5 judgment creditors, 196 real-estate data14-15 (3d ed. 2003) (explaining that, in addition to the original purpose of
"securing prompt recordation of all conveyances" and the equitable purpose of
protecting subsequent purchasers, recording acts also serve the constructive purpose
'of preserving an accessible history of each title, so that anyone needing the
information may reliably ascertain in whom the title is vested and any encumbrances
against it," and therefore "provide a system of semi-public records that have the same
dignity and evidentiary value that attaches to public records"); Rufford G. Patton,
Priorities,Recording, Registration, in 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 17.5, at 535 (1952)
("The very earliest recording acts show a desire on the part of the enacting bodies to
secure a permanent record of landholding, and to prevent fraudulent claims to lands
by concealment of transfers."); Francis S. Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and
Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 139 (1944) ("[T]he primary object of the
recording system was to rid conveyancing of livery of seisin but retain its publicital
advantages .. "); John H. Scheid, Down Labyrinthine Ways: A RecordingActs Guidefor
First Year Law Students, 80 U. DET. MERcY L. REv. 91, 101 (2002) (asserting that
recording statutes "encourage[e] filing, promote the notoriety of land ownership
and preserve the muniments, or evidences, of title").
191. See, e.g., Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Hutson, 210 S.W.3d 163, 168 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2006) (finding that a statute requiring filing timely mortgage release was
intended to advance accurate real estate records); Prouty v. Marshall, 74 A. 550, 571
(Pa. 1909) ("The object of the recording acts is to give notice to the world of that
which is spread upon the record."); Corpus v. Arriaga, 294 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex.
App. 2009) ("The purpose of recording statutes in Texas is to give notice to all
persons of the existence of the instrument.").
192. See Donald J. Kochan, Certainty of Title: PerspectivesAfter the MortgageForeclosure
Crisis on the EssentialRole of Effective Recording Systems, 66 ARK. L. REV. 267, 267 (2013).
Kochan's article is largely aimed at demonstrating that free-market advocates should
recognize a role for government title systems. See generally id. at 304-11. Kochan's
analysis is quite useful, especially for those with libertarian sympathies, but his focus
is different from ours: he does not discuss Article 9 in detail and explicitly eschews
advocating any particular reform of tile recording law or systems. See id. at 311.
193. See, e.g., Brooke Barnett, Comment, Use of Public Record Databases in Newspaper
and Television Newsrooms, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 557, 564 (2001) (noting that searches for
public "[p] roperty, financial, or business information" are among the most common
forms of database research performed by television stations); Jacob Gershman,
Senator'sProperty Records Highlight Gap, WALL ST.J., Aug. 6, 2012, at A15.
194. See, e.g., ALAN MACFARLANE, RECONSTRUCTING HISTORICAL COMMUNITES 7-8
(1977) (recounting social anthropologists' use of land records to study economic
and social change in India and Sri Lanka).
195.

See
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centered businesses such as Trulia and Zillow, 19 7 and, of course, title

insurers.198 Government entities including housing code enforcers' 99
and tax authorities make use of title records in discharging their
functions.0 °
Most of these uses exploit the fact that public information about
mortgage ownership creates an information commons. As the
intellectual-property literature demonstrates, such commons have
value even if their use is not entirely foreseeable when they are
created.'
Accordingly, patent law recognizes the value of
information dissemination; frequently this is described as a bargain in
6 (2005) (opposition research manual with checklist
including title records).
196. See, e.g., ALAN M. AHART, THE RUTrER GROUP CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE:
ENFORCING JUDGMENTS AND DEBTS ch. 6B-1, 6B-3 (2012) (concerning use of title
records for judgment collection and creation of lien by filing abstract ofjudgment).
197. See Trulia Estimates, TRULIA, http://
,.trulia.com/trulia-estimates
(last
visited Aug. 18, 2013) (describing Trulia's use of public real estate data in arriving at
house
value
estimates);
Wat
Is
a
Zestimate?,
ZILLOW,
http://www.zillow.com/wikipages/what-is-a-zestimate (last visited Aug. 18, 2013)
(describing Zillow's use of public real estate data in arriving at house value
estimates).
198. See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the
Mortgage Electronic Reistration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 1359, 1366 (2010) (asserting
that private insurers title plants "cannot function without the law creating legal
incentives to deposit records into the central government maintained system"). Title
insurers are especially important, as commentators have been arguing for at least
forty years that title companies have more or less superseded the public record
system. See, e.g., Charles J. Meyers, Book Review, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 742, 742-43
(1968) (reviewing JAN KRASNOWIECKI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OWNERSHIP AND
DEVELOPMENT OF LAND (1965)) ("Today the plain fact is that in most urban centers,
and in large parts of the outlands as well, title work is done by title insurance
companies.... About the only purpose I can see in a detailed examination of the
recording acts and the operation of the state-maintained registry of deeds is as an
object lesson to the profession .,..."). Meyers's "object lesson" was that the public
system's "onerous" search rules, "creaky" grantor-grantee index, and failure to better
protect users against mistakes led the title insurers to "come along with a better
mousetrap." Id. at 743. More recently, authors have emphasized the promise of title
insurance for developing countries. See, e.g., Priya S. Gupta, Ending Finders, Keepers:
The Use of Title Insurance To Alleviate Uncertainty in Land Holdings in India, 17 U.C.
DAViSJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 63, 108 (2010) ("The Indian case has provided, I hope, a
convincing account of the role that title insurance could play in achieving certainty
and predictability in land holdings."). However, title insurance in the United States
is at least arguably built upon the public system of land records. See Peterson, supra,
at 1366. Perhaps title insurance could function just as well if there were no public
records, but this claim is merely speculative.
199. See Kochan, supra note 192, at 295 (citing KermitJ. Lind, Collateral Matters:
Housing Code Compliance in the Mortgage Crisis, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 445, 448-49
(2012)).
200. Id. (citing Hernando de Soto, The Destruction of Economic Facts, BUSINESSWEEK,
May 2, 2011, at 60, 62).
201. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex PostJustificationsfor Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 143 (2004) (stating that because information cannot be used
up, "rather than a tragedy, an information commons is a 'comedy' in which everyone
benefits").
COURTHOUSE RESEARCH
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which the government exchanges a limited monopoly for disclosure
of the patent. 2 2 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Golan v.
Holder 0 3 recognizes the value of information dissemination in
copyright law.20 4 It seems likely that the value of making title
information public is greater, perhaps much greater, than the
benefits that can be identified today.
To be sure, public records have costs. Legitimate privacy interests
must be accommodated.2 5 For example, if the market moves to a
single mortgage-and-note instrument, as commentators have
proposed,20 6 policymakers will have to grapple with whether the
information in the note should be included in the lien registry.
Moreover, public title information can be used to devise frauds. 20 7 A
narrow focus on costs and benefits to the transacting parties
shortchanges these matters of public concern, as well as the public
interest in public records.20 8
202. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) ("[O]ur references to a
quid pro quo typically appear in the patent context."); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525
U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that
encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances
in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.");
Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor
After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1316-17 (2004) (criticizing the "common"
understanding of a patent as bargain).
203. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
204. See id. at 888-89 (holding that Congress's power under the Copyright Clause
encompasses not only efforts to promote creation of new works, but also efforts to
promote dissemination of existing ideas); Anupam Chander, Madhavi Sunder &
Uyen Le, International Decisions, Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. (2012), 106 AM.J. INT'L
L. 637, 641-42 (2012) (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of the
importance of dissemination, as opposed to simply creation, as a way of promoting
learning).
205. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049,
1050-51 (2000) (arguing that noncontractual government-imposed information
privacy rules are "not easily defensible under existing free speech law" and could
create a slippery slope leading to other speech restrictions); see also Fred H. Cate, The
Commodification of Information and the Control of Expression, AMICUS CURIAE, Sept.-Oct.
2002, at 3, 7 (calling for "balancing laws that restrict information flows with the
legitimate need for, and legal protection of, those flows" in a discussion of consumer
privacy regulation).
206. See White, supra note 32, at 498-99 (arguing that a single mortgage-and-note
instrument better facilitates negotiating and transfer of real-estate).
207. BENITO ARRUINADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE:
THEORY AND POLICY OF CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES 137 (2012) (giving examples of
potential use of public title records to perpetrate frauds, including "the proverbial
pursuit of wealthy heiresses by dowry-seeking bachelors," the sale of vacant houses
after learning owners' identities from title records, and identity theft).
208. Issues such as privacy and the potential use of public records to facilitate
fraud are important and should be part of a comprehensive review of the benefits of
public mortgage recording. However, we focus for the remainder of this Article on
the cost and inconvenience to the transacting parties as the downside of mortgage
recording. We do so for ease of exposition and to maintain the focus of the
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It could be that the concerns raised here do not apply to recording
of mortgages, or more specifically, of mortgage assignments. After
all, when mortgage assignments are not recorded, the existence of a
mortgage on the property may be on the public record even if there
is no record of the current owner of the mortgage or associated
note.20 9 However, there seems to be at least some demand for
mortgage ownership information among the general LEXIS-using
public. The information service's "Public Records" function permits
users to search property records for the identity of the original lender
on a given mortgage. If reliable, comprehensive information about
subsequent owners were available, perhaps LEXIS would make that
information available as well.210
A related objection is that even if the true owner of the mortgage
were recorded, securitized mortgages are held in trust, so the public
record would disclose only something akin to: "LaSalle Bank, N.A., as
But even this meager
trustee for 2006-HE6 GSAMP Trust."
information may be of some value to borrowers and others, as both
consumer law professors21 and practitioners2 12 have pointed out,
because it discloses one of the parties with authority to take action
with respect to the mortgage and provides a reference point for
further investigation. Moreover. looking at the issue from a broader
perspective, perhaps the law should require more public disclosures
about securitizations in the public records; the identity of the servicer
is one obvious candidate for disclosure. 213 There may well be good
reasons not to disclose more than just the name of the securitization

discussion, but also because cost and inconvenience seem to be the main objections
at present to using the public mortgage recording system.
209. Cf Whitman, Negotiability, supra note 92, at 769 (2010) (suggesting that no

record-keeping system for note ownership is needed).
210. LEXIS apparently has found it worthwhile to pay a data vendor for the
original lender information, which apparently is ultimately derived from public
records. One might argue that demand for this function indicates only demand for
information about who can enforce the mortgage, rather than about who owns it.
But securitizations are intended to be structured so that the person who can enforce
is the servicer, who may or may not be the original lender. See Levitin & Twomey,
supra note 29, at 23 ("Servicers also are responsible for handling defaulted loans,
including prosecuting foreclosures and attempting to mitigate investors' losses.").
211. See, e.g., White, supra note 32, at 496 ("IT]here is a genuine consumer
borrower interest in transparency of mortgage assignments so that the identity of the
real counterparty is known.").
212. See, e.g., Adam Leitman Bailey & Dov Treiman, Moving Beyond the Mistakes of
MERS to a Secure and Profitable National Title System, PROB. & PROP. MAG., July-Aug.
2012, at 40, 45 (arguing that recording should use modem technology to make
searching easy, instead of so difficult that people have to hire firms to do title
research).
213. See generally White, supra note 32, at 497 (suggesting that servicer
relationships should have to be disclosed in foreclosure litigation).
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trustee in the public real-property records; our point is that the law
should reflect a reasoned consideration of the tradeoffs involved,
including the value of public records.
Some have argued that it is incorrect to blame developments of the
1990s such as the development of MERS and the revisions of Article 9
for the degradation of public mortgage records because the damage
was done earlier. The argument is that participants in the mortgage
securitization industry decided to stop recording mortgage
assignments in the 1980s, if not before.2 14 But the industry did not
stop recording mortgage assignments entirely in the 1980s: mortgage
assignments apparently were still commonly recorded as of 1999.215
The public system had (and still has) information about mortgage
ownership that we contend may be worth preserving, especially given
that the social value of public records probably has increased rather
than decreased with the continued advance of information
technology. More fundamentally, the important question is not
really whether the Article 9 revisions or MERS in fact caused any
particular decrease in the information content of public mortgage
records, but what incentives should or should not exist for
maintaining public records of mortgage ownership.
Certainly, it is not crystal clear at this stage exactly what records
should be public. The costs and benefits of public title records, in
general and as applied to real property mortgages in particular, are a
legitimate subject for discussion and debate. But the Article 9
revisions were drafted in a process that may not have been fully
inclusive,216 and the revisions apparently were not seriously debated
in the state legislatures at adoption.2 17 Subsequent events have shown

214. See Dale A. Whitman, A Proposalfor a National Mortgage Registry: MERS Done
Right, 78 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming winter 2013) [hereinafter Whitman, MERS Done
Right] (manuscript at 22-25). Interestingly, the 1986 Secondary Mortgage Market
Guide cited as evidence of the industry's abandonment of mortgage recording states
that recordation is not necessary "unless it is required by law to perfect the buyer's
ownership interest"-precisely the issue addressed in this Article. Id. (manuscript at
23) (quoting CHARLES L. EDSON & BARRY G. JACOBS, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
GUIDE § 9.03[1] [c] (1986)).
215. See Dale A. Whitman, Digital Recording of Real Estate Conveyances, 32 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 227, 241-42 (1999) [hereinafter Whitman, Digital Recording]
(asserting that mortgage assignments are among the "twenty or thirty form
documents that account for the vast bulk of real estate recordings").
216. Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9,
Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 631-32 (1998) (arguing that,
among other problems, the uniform law drafting process "unduly constrict[s]" a
number of represented groups).
217. See McDonnell, Article 9 Greedy?, supra note 10, at 241 (asserting that "[t]here

appears to be no organized opposition" to adoption of Article 9 revisions).
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that abandoning incentives for public title records of mortgage
ownership may have been a mistake.
Policymakers should revisit the balance between party convenience
and public records. They should do so conscious not only of the cost
and delay that the traditional title recording system apparently
imposed, but also of the value of public records of mortgage
ownership. Specifically, policymakers should consider adopting a
unified solution for land tide law that offers both the efficiency and
security that transaction participants need and the degree of
transparency about real-property interests that the public interest
requires.
IV. MOVING TOWARD PUBLIC MORTGAGE OWNERSHIP RECORDS

Mortgage recording traditionally has been cumbersome and
relatively costly, but it produces records that are useful to the
transacting parties, to other parties who may transact mortgages, and
to the public at large. The Article 9 regime, which identifies the
promissory note in a private security agreement that does not have to
be filed publicly, is just the opposite-it is inexpensive and efficient
for the parties to the transaction, but it does not produce the public
Digital recording, which has
benefit of public records.
"revolutionized" Article 9 filing for interests other than real-property
public records
mortgages,"' seems to offer the best of both:
cheaply.
and
efficiently
generated
Commentators have noted that digitization undermines some
chain-of-title doctrines,"'9 and digitization also undermines the
strongest justifications for Article 9's rules on mortgage transfer. If
private authentication is no longer much cheaper than creating
public records, there is no need to subordinate public records to
Policymakers should
private ones in the name of efficiency. 22
218. 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 31-10, at 185.
219. See, e.g., Emily Bayer-Pacht, Note, The Computerization of Land Records: How
Advances in Recording Systems Affect the Rationale Behind Some Existing Chain of Title
Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 337, 339-40 (2010) (asserting that computerization
undermines the rationale for four chain of tide doctrines).
220. Indeed, to the extent that digitization makes recording cheap and easy,
recording systems become more attractive for all types of property, not just
mortgages. Mortgages present a strong case for recording because of the historical
public interest in land title records, but perhaps recording should be considered for
other types of property claims that are currently governed by a private authentication
regime. For example, registration of trademarks and copyrights is optional, and
legal incentives for copyright registration have generally decreased over time. See
Mose Bracey, Note, Searching for Substance in the Midst of Formality: Copyright
Registration as a Condition Precedent to the Exercise of Subject-MatterJurisdictionby Federal
Courts over Copyright Infringement Claims, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 111, 123-33 (2006)
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consider replacing the Article 9 regime for mortgages with a
recording regime in tandem with the expansion of digital
1
recording.

A.

22

Legal Infrastructurefor Mortgage Ownership Recording

The basic legal infrastructure for digital recording is already in
place in many jurisdictions. Although it has not always been clear
that state laws from the pre-digital era permit digital recording,222 the
Uniform Law Commission proposed a uniform act promoting digital
real-property recording-the Uniform Real Property Electronic
Recording Act22 (URPERA)-in 2005. The majority of states have
adopted a version of the model statute. 224 URPERA provides that
225
electronic documents with electronic signatures can be recorded
and that an electronic signature satisfies notarization and related
6
requirements.

22

What is currently missing is a clear incentive for parties to maintain
current records of mortgage loan ownership. Accordingly, we
suggest that policymakers consider replacing the muddled and
confusing rules on mortgage loan ownership discussed above with a
regime that clearly requires that interests in mortgage loans be
recorded to be protected. The most straightforward approach for
creating such a regime would be a nationwide law: either a uniform
state act or a federal statute governing mortgage recording on a
national or a local registry. Certain changes to the UCC would need
(tracing the evolution of registration and its generally declining importance).
Cheaper registration could suggest a reason for reversing the trend away from
formality in this area if there is value to the registry itself.
221. We are by no means the first to advocate digital recording. See, e.g., Dale A.
Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic Recording Act, 24 W. NEW.
ENG. L. REv. 245-46 (2002) [hereinafter Whitman, Are We There Yet?] (proposing
Uniform Electronic Recording Act to facilitate electronic recording); Whitman,
Digital Recording, supra note 215, at 227-28 (advocating legislation to promote
digitization of land title records in order to save costs).
222. See Whitman, Are We There Yet?, supra note 221, at 246 (suggesting that states
should adopt digital recording acts that entail conveyancing via electronic
documents, creating a public records system that accepts those electronic
documents, and maintaining an electronic records database).
223. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY
ELECTRONIC RECORDING ACT § 3(a)-(b) (2005) [hereinafter URPERA], available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/real%20property%20electronic%20recor
ding/urpera-final-apr05.pdf.
224. See Acts:
Real Property Electronic Recording Act, UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Real%20Property%20Electronic%2ORec
ording%20Act (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) (showing that twenty-six states, as well as
the Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia, adopted the URPERA and that two
states currently have similar pending legislation).
225. URPERA §§ 3(a)-(b), 4(b) (2).
226. Id. § 3(c).
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to accompany the new statute, such as repealing Section 9-308(e) as
applied to real-property mortgages.2 27 We discuss below whether the
registry should be national or local.
Under our proposal, a party's ownership interest in a mortgage
loan would be vulnerable to bona fide purchasers and lien creditors,
tlsc such time as the party
and therefore bankruptcy trustees, 2281until
recorded its interest in whatever public registry is adopted.
Recording would trigger other state laws based on a party's status as
mortgagee of record. An agent could record in the name of a
principal, but the parties would have to disclose the nature of the
relationship. 229 The statute could take the form of a "pure race,"
"race-notice," or "pure notice" rule.
It might be argued that making an unrecorded interest in a
mortgage vulnerable is too severe a sanction. If putting ownership of
mortgage loans at risk is deemed too harsh a penalty for failure to
record, the statute could make recording mandatory and impose
sanctions for failing to do so. The key point is that there would be
clear incentives to create public records of mortgage loan ownership.
The law could go further and make recording on the registry a
prerequisite to being able to enforce the mortgage, as Alan White has
suggested.23 0 This extension would increase the incentive to record,
but it is not strictly necessary to our proposal.
227. U.C.C. § 9-20 3 (g) (2011) provides that a note assignment gives an interest in
the mortgage that is good as between the parties. Section 9-308(e) provides that the
interest in the mortgage is perfected automatically with no further action. The latter
provision is more clearly in potential conflict with real-estate recording statutes. It
might also be necessary to clarify or change how the UCC's rules for promissory
notes apply to notes that are secured by real-property mortgages. Assuming the
recording rules should apply to both note and mortgage because they should be
governed by a unified regime, additional changes to UCC provisions governing
perfection of interests in promissory notes would be needed to clarify that parties
must record interests in mortgage notes. For example, U.C.C. § 9-309(4), which
provides for automatic perfection of interests in promissory notes, would be
changed. Likewise, U.C.C. § 9-313(a), which provides for perfection of interests in
negotiable notes by possession, might have to be amended for mortgage notes. This
latter change does not seem like a great loss to the industry, as it does not appear to
be a standard practice to take possession of mortgage notes today. See sources cited
supranote 92.
228. A bankruptcy trustee succeeds to the status of bona fide purchaser of real
property from the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (3) (2006), and to the status of a lien
creditor of the debtor. Id. § 544(a) (1). It is not absolutely clear what competing
claimants should prevail over unrecorded interests in mortgages; our proposal is a
starting point. A rule that makes interests in mortgage loans vulnerable to the
transferor's bankruptcy trustee seems likely to induce recording.
229. Alan White has made a similar proposal. See White, supra note 32, at 497
(proposing that requiring full disclosure of all principal-agent relationships would
increase electronic mortgage and note system reliability while providing full
consumer protection).
230. See id. at 499.
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As previously discussed, a regime providing incentives for mortgage
recording would not be an innovation; most states already have laws
on their books that do exactly that. The issue is simply removing the
confusing and potentially conflicting Article 9 provisions so that
industry participants have clear guidance about what the law requires.
The new system and its associated legal framework would eliminate
the confusing interaction between Article 9 and the real-property
laws, and would replace both with a unified legal regime.
B.

InstitutionalInfrastructurefor Mortgage Ownership Recording

In order for a recording-based legal regime to make sense in the
era of securitization, there must be a practical way to record quickly
and at low cost. Fortunately, public recording systems are already
moving in this direction. Commentators have noted a "consistent
trend" '' toward computerized systems that offer non-chronological
search options, often including searches on property location rather
than the standard grantor and grantee search option. 2 As early as
2002, Salt Lake County, Utah; Orange County, California; Maricopa
County, Arizona; and many other local jurisdictions stored
documents in digital form and permitted online searches, although
they did not yet permit recording of original digital documents. 33
Although not all jurisdictions have adopted any form of digital
recording, the technology continues to spread. 4 In a number of
jurisdictions, some digitally recorded documents are scanned paper
documents, but other recorded documents are created digitally
without any hard copies.235 Practitioners have noted and applauded
the trend toward digital property records, calling for leadership at
the state level to develop modern digitized title systems and pointing
out the potential benefits to borrowers, lenders, and title insurers.236

231. Bayer-Pacht, supra note 219, at 357 n.118.
232. Id. at 358-60.
233. Whitman, Are We There Yet?, supra note 221, at 247. New York County's
Automated City Register Information System (ACRIS) permits online index searches
and viewing digital copies of deeds. See Bailey & Treiman, supranote 212, at 42, 46;
Bayer-Pacht, supra note 219, at 359 n.128. San Bernardino County, California
permitted electronic recording as early as 1992. See E-mail from Benjamin Weber,
Senior Policy Analyst, City & Cnty. of S.F., Office of the Assessor-Recorder, to John
Patrick Hunt, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Davis School of Law (Aug. 11,
2012, 3:55 PM) (on file with authors).
234. San Francisco County implemented electronic recording in April 2013. Press
Release, San Francisco Office of the Assessor-Recorder, Assessor-Recorder Chu
Announces Beginning of E-Recording
(April 15, 2013),
available at
http://www.sfassessor.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentID= 1287.
235. Id.
236. See Bailey & Treiman, supra note 212, at 45-46.
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An authoritative mortgage registry could take a national or a local
form. We discuss the benefits and drawbacks of each structure in
turn.
1. Alternative one: Authoritative nationallien registry
a. Description of the authoritativenationallien registry and its legal
infrastructure
Policymakers should consider a national, authoritative electronic
mortgage lien registry. Real-property title scholars,"' consumer law
scholars, 38 comparative institutional economists,2" 9 and the
Governors of the Federal Reserve System24 all have called for some
kind of national, authoritative registry of mortgage liens. 24 1 In
previous scholarship, the authors of this Article have compared such
a

system favorably to

alternatives. 24 2

This Article

provides

a

preliminary description of such a system and of some of the issues
involved in implementing it.
By "authoritative," we mean a registry that would supplant both the
Article 9 rules for mortgage ownership perfection and the state realproperty law of mortgage recording, as described above. 243 By
"national," we mean that there should be a single means for
transacting parties to record and assign mortgages on property
located anywhere in the United States. A national solution avoids the
inefficiency of differing and potentially conflicting state and local
rules and practices. Although it may be possible to create a system

237. See, e.g., Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title
Recording System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 25 (2011) (proposing a gradual shift
to a federal system through private opt-in to a national registry); Dale A. Whitman, A
National Mortgage Registry: Why We Need It, and How To Do It, 45 UCC L.J. 1, 16-32
(2013); Whitman, MERS Done Right, supra note 214 (manuscript at 2-3).

238. See, e.g., White, supra note 32, at 497-99 (proposing mechanisms to create
such a system).
239. See ARRUfqADA, supra note 207, at 113-14.
240. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET:
CURRENT CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 24-25 (2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-whitepaper-20120104.pdf.
241. A related proposal, focusing on the note rather than the mortgage, calls for a
national registry of electronic notes. SeeJames M. Davis, Paper Weight: Problems in the
Documentation and Enforcement of Transferred Mortgage Loans, and a Proposal for an
at 4-5).
(manuscript
Electronic Solution, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2013)
Davis's proposal generally seems compatible with ours, as he advocates creating a
public record of mortgage loan ownership. Id.
242. See Hunt, Stanton & Wallace, supra note 28, at 61-62.
243. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
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that is uniform for users while retaining local control, a national
244
system is the most straightforward way to achieve uniformity.
Our suggestion is not simply to legitimize MERS, as some have
proposed.245 MERS is not public. Instead, it is owned by the
mortgage industry, including the government-sponsored housing
entities, and thus may tend to favor inexpensive recording over
publicity of records. MERS's behavior to date suggests that it is not
oriented toward maintaining high-quality, publicly available records.
Although representatives of MERS claim that a borrower can find out
who is registered on the system as the mortgage holder, they do not
claim that this information is public.2 46 Moreover, MERS does not
seem to provide a strong incentive to keep transfer records current.
Although failing to update records to reflect transfers is currently a
violation of MERS rules,247 the authors are not aware that MERS has
enforced these rules. 248 There does not seem to be any other
244. Cf Marsh, supra note 237, at 25 (discussing possible local opposition to a
national system and a proposal for gradual transition). Marsh has suggested a
uniform act that would permit parcels of real property to move permanently out of
the local title recording system into a new federal system. See id. However, Marsh
does not address the relationship between title recording and the UCC. The
interaction between the new federal recording system and the UCC remains unclear
under her proposal. Moreover, we are unsure that it is advisable to replace local
land records for all purposes, rather than just for mortgages. It is possible to imagine
separate, parallel systems for mortgage and other claims. Although such a setup is
probably inefficient, others have embraced a separate registry for real estate liens
without expressly calling for abandonment of the traditional county-based system.
See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 240, at 24-25; White,
supra note 32, at 498-99. We also are unsure that the migration to a new system
should happen on a parcel-by-parcel, as opposed to county-by-county, state-by-state,
or national basis. Whatever the scope of the national registry, migration on the basis
of larger geographic units seems more efficient. Although a transition period
undoubtedly would be needed, a parcel-by-parcel approach does lengthen the period
that two systems are operating for any given geographic region. Relatedly, we do not
necessarily embrace the individual-choice aspect of Marsh's proposal. Owner's
choice is inconsistent with a more efficient region-by-region migration, and, as we
have discussed, many of the crucial issues with title records are public rather than
private.
245. See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 166, at 406 (suggesting "reform of the current
mortgage and note system, ideally in the form of a readily accessible and editable
electronic registry system, e.g., a fully generalized MERS system" as one potential
response to crisis); Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine: Reconsidering
Standing, Transparency, and Accuracy in Foreclosures, 29 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 551, 610
(2011) ("MERS itself could be strengthened and regulated to form the foundation of
a new, alternative national recording system.").
246. See Declaration of William C. Hultman 11, In reAgard, 444 B.R. 231 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10-77338-REG) (asserting that a homeowner can use a toll-free
number or website to find out the servicer of its mortgage loan).
247. MERSCORP HOLDINGS, INC., supra note 133, r. 2, § 3(c)-(e).
248. Indeed, as of late 2009, MERS Inc.'s CEO testified that MERS does not so
much "expect" that members enter transfers on the system as "operate a system that
offers that capability." Deposition of R.K Arnold at 178, Henderson v. MERSCORP,
Inc., No. CV-08-900805.00, 2010 WL 8248633 (Montgomery Cty., Ala. Cir. Ct. May 6,
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incentive to register assignments on the system. MERS does not
appear to have been designed to run as a system in which publicity of
records was an important value, and it is unclear whether regulation
could improve MERS.249
Moreover, as we have pointed out
elsewhere, the corporate entities housing MERS could go bankrupt,
with potentially distressing consequences.2 0
b.

Implementation issues with an authoritativenational lien registry

Although a thorough discussion of potential constitutional issues
with an authoritative national lien registry lies beyond the scope of
this paper, we do not perceive serious constitutional issues under
current law.
Article 9 recognizes the possibility of federal
preemption,25 1 as

it

must.152

The federal government

already

operates filing systems governing mortgages on aircraft253 and5
2
ships, 254 and security interests in and/or assignments of patents,

registered

trademarks, 256

and registered copyrights,

25v

-

all apparently

2010), 2009 WL 8631162.
249. A related point is that MERS, Inc. is a private entity. If the electronic registry
were made mandatory, parties would be required to transact with a private entity in
order to transfer mortgages. As the struggle over the Affordable Care Act's
individual mandate indicates, forcing transactions with private entities can create
political resistance. See generally Nat'l Fed'n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2584-87 (2012) (evaluating a challenge brought by twenty-six state attorneys
general to the Affordable Care Act individual mandate, which the Court described as
a mandate that individuals "become active in commerce by purchasing a product").
250. See Hunt, Stanton & Wallace, supra note 28, at 21 (contemplating that
lawsuits and investigations of MERS, Inc. could potentially lead to bankruptcy).
251. See U.C.C. § 9-109(c)(1) (2011) ("This article does not apply to the extent
that a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this article .... ").
252. See id. § 9-109 cmt. 8 ("Article 9 defers to federal law only when and to the
extent that it must-i.e., when federal law preempts it.").
253. See 49 U.S.C. § 44107 (2006) (providing that a security interest in an aircraft
must be recorded with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration).
254. See 46 U.S.C. § 31321 (a) (1) (providing that a mortgage "that includes any
part of a documented vessel" must be filed with the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security to be valid, except as against mortgagor, mortgagor s heirs, and
persons with actual notice of the mortgage). When federal ship mortgage law was
overhauled effective January 1, 1989, one commentator observed, "As a practical
matter, the Coast Guard will have to completely computerize all vessel
documentation and mortgage information under the new law. The House Report
goes into some detail about the computer system." David Mcl. Williams, Recent
Developments in the Law of MarineFinance: Public Law 100-710, 36 FED. B. NEWS &J. 371,
371-72 (1989).
255. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 ("An assignment, grant, or conveyance [of a patent] shall
be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable
consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark
Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent
purchase or mortgage."). Some commentators and courts have concluded that the
Article 9 filing system, rather than the federal system, governs security interests in
patents. See, e.g., 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 30-12, at 86-87.
256. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a) (4) ("An assignment shall be void against any
subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, unless the
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without constitutional problems. A federal filing system governs
perfection and priority of federal tax liens..25
Given the national
scope of the mortgage market, creating and mandating the use of a
federal mortgage lien registry seems squarely within Congress's power
to regulate interstate commerce. 5 9 States or local authorities might
rely on real-property recording's historically local character to try to
fashion a Tenth Amendment challenge to legislation mandating use
of the federal registry to protect interests in mortgages, but as two
leading commentators observe, "The federalism principle that
prevents the federal government from ordering state or local
governments to take certain governmental actions appears to be a
very limited principle,"' 2' and the decisions establishing it "did not
grant state and local government immunity from federal regulation
of commercial activity." 261 Legislation creating the national registry
need not require the states to do anything, so it does not seem to
resemble the laws at issue in the two most prominent decisions
262
upholding Tenth Amendment challenges, New York v. United States
2 63

and Printz v. United States.

rescribed information reporting the assignment is recorded in the United States
atent and Trademark Office within 3 months after the date of the assignment or
prior to the subsequent purchase"). As with patents, some courts and commentators
ave reached the conclusion that the Article 9 filing system, not the federal system,
governs security interests in registered trademarks. See 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 10, § 30-12, at 87.
257. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) ("As between two conflicting transfers, the one
executed first prevails if it is recorded, in the manner required to give constructive
notice under subsection (c) .... Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded
first in such manner, and if taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the
basis of a binding promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier
transfer."); see also id. § 205(c) (providing that "[r]ecordation of a document in the
Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the
recorded document" if the document reasonably identifies the work and the work is
registered); In re Peregrine Entm't, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194, 204-06 (C.D. Cal. 1990)
(finding a filing under UCC Article 9 ineffective to perfect a security interest in
registered copyrights). See 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 30-12 at 88-89, for
an argument that the Peregrineopinion, which created "mischief," has been undercut
by the 1999 revisions to Article 9.
258. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6326.
259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)
(holding that even if an economic or commercial activity is purely intrastate,
Congress may regulate the activity if there is a rational basis for believing that in
aggregate the activity substantially affects interstate commerce).
260.

1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 4.10(d) (i), at 690 (5th ed. 2012).
261. Id.
262. 505 U.S. 144, 174-75 (1992) (striking down a federal statute that required
states to take title of radioactive waste).
263. 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (invalidating a federal statute requiring state
officials to conduct firearm background checks).
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We see two major potential obstacles to adopting national lien
recording. First, there is a monetary cost of setting up a national title
registry, including its legal infrastructure, and implementing
conforming changes to state law. An analysis of these costs is beyond
the scope of this Article but clearly would be a crucial step in
deciding to move forward with the proposal.
The second, and probably more important, potential obstacle is
political. There are three important groups of stakeholders who
might either support or oppose the proposal. The first is government
actors. Local recorders might resist the loss of revenue and authority
that could come along with national registry.2 " The change could
accompany a move of the title recording function from the local to
the state2 65 or even national level. Moreover, states might resist the
national registry as a threat to their sovereignty and authority over
land.266 Although the existing complaints about failure to record
mortgage assignments have focused on the concrete matters of fees267
and the quality of title records,2" rather than abstract questions of
sovereignty, local resistance to the national registry seems like a very
real possibility.
The second group is MERS's members, which include not just the
leading federal entities operating in the mortgage market,269 but also
the major private mortgage lenders.2 7 They have invested in MERS
264. Seemingly anticipating the possibility that local recorders might resist
electronic recording, URPERA provides two alternatives for adopting standards for
electronic recording. One provides for a commission in which recorders are a
majority, and the other provides for implementation by a state agency. See URPERA

§5.
265. See Bailey & Treiman, supra note 212, at 46; Whitman, Are We There Yet?, supra
note 221, at 269-70 (suggesting that local land recorders should have control over,
or at least input into, any statewide electronic recording agency); Whitman, Digital
Recording, supra note 215, at 260-61 (arguing that a state system would allow
searchers to "work in the records county or group of counties" and "make it easier to
hire highly competent people to manage the system").
266. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 251, 282 (1997)
(asserting that to "diminish" Idaho's control over lands and waters in its territory
would cause "offense to Idaho's sovereign authority and its standing in the Union").
267. See, e.g. Montgomery Cty., Pa. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436, 45051 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (denying a motion to dismiss a county recorder of deeds' lawsuit
based on the failure to record mortgage assignments and finding that the recorder,
by pleading lost recording fees, "pleaded a pecuniary interest" sufficient to allow the
suit to go forward).
268. See, e.g., Nueces Cty. v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00131, 2013
WL 3353948, at *2, *20 (S.D. Tex. July 3, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss county
recorder of deeds' lawsuit and finding that alleged lost fees and degradation of title
records satisfy Article III standing requirements).
269. See Member Search, MERS ONLINE, https://www.mersonline.org/mers/mbr
search/validatembrsearch.jsp (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) (MERS members include
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the FDIC, and eleven federal home loan banks).
270. See id. (MERS members include Bank of America, N.A., Citibank, N.A., JP
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as an alternative to mortgage assignment recording and might prefer
to keep the system in place. However, it is at least conceivable that
removing the legal uncertainty around MERS could motivate these
stakeholders to support an authoritative federal registry.
The third group consists of participants in the title industry.27'
Title insurers, for example, have invested in the creation of relatively
user-friendly plant records that reorganize the information contained
in official title records.272 Centralizing title records in a single,
searchable national registry-or improving the usefulness of official
records in any respect-might undermine this investment and create
resistance. More generally, title insurers might resist any large-scale
overhaul of an environment in which they have adapted to thrive.
But the industry might be persuaded to support the new approach.
As others have noted, title companies could profit from representing
public records in more efficient and user-friendly ways.273 In any
event, the pecuniary interests of the title industry should not in
themselves derail efforts to explore an improved recording system.
2.

Alternative two: Upgradinglocal recordingsystems
Although a national system enjoys widespread support among
commentators and seems to be the most efficient alternative, the
political obstacles could be significant. As discussed, states and
localities simply might not be willing to cooperate in transferring
responsibilities that have been theirs for centuries.
Further,
recording fees are a source of revenue that local governments may
not want to give up, as recent county recorder lawsuits against MERS
2 74
to recover unpaid fees suggest.
These political issues with a national system suggest that
policymakers should consider a second-best alternative: widespread
upgrades to local systems to handle electronic mortgage

Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., U.S. Bank, N.A, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as well as
affiliates of each of these).
271. See Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic
RegistrationSystem's Land Title Theory, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 111, 155 (2011) (arguing
that title insurance companies should "take a candid, reflective look" at the issue of
public versus private recording systems).
272. See, e.g., CEB, CALIFORNIATITLE INSURANCE PRACTICE § 4.10 (2d ed. 2011).
273. See Bailey & Treiman, supra note 212, at 45-46 ("Title companies could make
money, and increase efficiency by designing computer programs that could access
the publicly published land records, and analyze and index in any variety of creative
new ways that could, in effect, produce a rudimentary title report in a matter of
seconds.").
274. See, e.g., Dallas Cnty., Tex. v. MERSCORP, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-2733-O (N.D.
Tex. May 25, 2012) (denying in part a motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by three
Texas counties to recover recording fees).
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assignments. 27 5 A local approach, once universally adopted, might be
almost as efficient as a national one. Local courts 276 and tax
authorities 277 already transact electronically, presumably reaping
efficiency benefits, without unifying these functions at the state or
national level. It is true that national entities such as the GSEs would
have to deal with different local authorities, but it is likely that the
process of recording could be made uniform across counties through
the use of common software standards. Moreover, different counties'
systems could be reached through a common portal. Although an
analysis of the technical issues is beyond the scope of this Article, if all
counties adopt compatible forms of electronic recording, in the end
the user might not notice the difference between local and national
control.
The most significant difficulty with a local approach is the
likelihood that there will be a period in which there is a patchwork,
with some counties using electronic recording and others using
traditional paper-based recording. Unlike federalization of land
records, it seems unlikely that states and localities will resist switching
from paper to electronic recording as a matter of principle. Rather,
it seems that the key issue would be funding, particularly for less
affluent or rural counties.2 78 But recent events illustrate that
mortgage recording is a national problem for the federal government
and mortgage industry. Accordingly, federal authorities and industry
participants should consider shouldering some of the financial
burden of upgrading local mortgage systems.
CONCLUSION

The ambiguities that currently afflict mortgage-transfer law
increase risks both for parties who transact in mortgages and for
borrowers. Greater clarity is needed, but we suggest that greater
clarity should accompany a change in the substantive direction of the
275. Under this proposal, the UCC's private authentication provisions could be
dropped on a state-by-state basis once all the counties in a given state have adopted
electronic recording. The UCC provisions potentially could be repealed if a
supermajority of counties in the state adopt recording.
276. See, e.g., Small Claims-General Information, L.A. SUPERIOR COURT,
https://ww2.lasuperiorcourt.org/eFiling/eFilingNotice.aspx (last visited Aug. 13,
2013) (providing instructions for electronic filing of documents in the Los Angeles

Superior Court).
277. See, e.g., Pay Property Taxes, YOLO CNTY. http://www.yolocounty.org/Index
.aspx?page=1661 (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) (providing for online payment of Yolo

County property taxes).
278.

See Lisa R. Pruitt, The Forgotten Fifth: Rural Youth and Substance Abuse, 20 STAN.
(noting the "digital divide between rural and

L. & POL'Y REv. 359, 388 n.181 (2009)
urban residents").
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law. The most recent major development in mortgage transfer law,
the mortgage-transfer rules in the 1999 revisions to Article 9, seem to
have been aimed at eliminating legal incentives to maintain public
records of mortgage assignments. The mortgage-transfer rules seem
to have the same goal as MERS and are of approximately the same
vintage. Both seem to reflect a preoccupation with reducing the cost
and burden of recording mortgage transfers with local authorities.
The focus seems to have been exclusively on the cost of maintaining
public records of mortgage ownership.
We seek to refocus the discussion on the benefits side of the ledger
and to remind the reader that public records have value. To that
end, we recommend that policymakers reconsider the balance
between private efficiency and convenience on the one hand and
public records on the other. In so doing, legislators should consider
the savings associated with digital recording. Digitization pushes the
balance between economy and publicity toward publicity. It is time
to consider a legal regime that gives transacting parties incentives to
record their interests in mortgages, and in so doing, to reach an
appropriate balance between public and private.

